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INTRODUCTION 
Personal jurisdiction is, at best, a confusing and unpredictable 
doctrine.  Even unsuccessful challenges to personal jurisdiction consume 
inordinate amounts of pretrial resources, and successful challenges may 
leave American consumers without a remedy when harmed by foreign 
manufacturers.1  These difficulties are most pronounced in product liability 
 
 1.  See Dustin E. Buehler, Jurisdictional Incentives, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 105, 108–09 (2012) 
(“Disputes over personal jurisdiction occur more than a thousand times each year, twice as frequently as 
they did only two decades ago. These disputes decrease the chance that plaintiffs will be able to litigate 
in a convenient forum, and undoubtedly affect plaintiffs’ cost-benefit analysis as they consider whether 
to proceed with their lawsuits.”); Andrew F. Popper, Unavailable and Unaccountable: A Free Ride for 
Foreign Manufacturers of Defective Consumer Goods, 36 BUREAU NAT’L AFF. PRODUCT SAFETY & 
LIABILITY REP. 219, 225 (May 3, 2008) (“[E]ven when a foreign manufacturer’s products foreseeably 
enter the stream of commerce in the United States, generate a profit for the manufacturer, and 
proximately cause harm, the manufacturer stands a very good chance of avoiding responsibility when 
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actions against foreign manufacturers.  The United States Supreme Court’s 
recent personal jurisdiction decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. 
Nicastro, presents another missed opportunity to bring clarity and 
coherence to specific personal jurisdiction, particularly in the context of 
international manufacturers of products.2  Although the Court’s recent 
general personal jurisdiction cases, Daimler AG v. Bauman and Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, provided some much-needed 
guidance on general personal jurisdiction over business entities,3 Nicastro 
continued the unfortunate pattern of a Court fractured over the animating 
rationale for, and the scope of, specific personal jurisdiction, particularly as 
it applies in product liability actions against foreign manufacturers.4 
Claimants are not the only ones harmed as a result of this continued 
incoherence. American manufacturers are also at a competitive 
disadvantage to foreign manufacturers because American manufacturers 
are fully subject to American product liability law, while foreign 
manufacturers can discount the cost of complying with American product 
liability law because personal jurisdiction reduces the risk of being hailed 
before an American court. Nicastro further encourages foreign 
manufacturers to avoid our liability system altogether by using 
intermediaries to distribute their products, thus avoiding “minimum 
contacts” with any state.5 
Similarly, American money judgments are subject to a certain level of 
international discrimination, despite more than fair treatment of foreign 
money judgments in American courts.  In the seminal case of Hilton v. 
Guyot, the Supreme Court required reciprocity, that is, whether the foreign 
court would enforce a similar American judgment, before enforcing a 
foreign judgment.6  Most states, however, have discarded the Hilton 
Court’s reciprocity requirement when enacting laws governing judgment 
recognition and enforcement.7  While judgments obtained abroad are 
 
those products injure or kill U.S. consumers.”). 
 2.  See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (containing three separate 
opinions, none of which garnered support from a majority of the Court, and which could not agree on 
the approach lower courts should take in stream of commerce cases). 
 3.  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2013) (simplifying general jurisdiction to the 
“essentially at home” standard); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 
(2011) (same). 
 4.  See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112, 117 (1987). 
 5.  Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790. 
 6.  Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 227–28 (1895). 
 7.  See Ronald A. Brand, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, FED. JUD. CENTER 
INT’L LITIG. GUIDE, 11 (April 2012), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ brandenforce.pdf/$file/ 
brandenforce.pdf [hereinafter Brand, Recognition and Enforcement] (“Specifically, Florida, Idaho, 
Maine, North Carolina, Ohio, and Texas make reciprocity a discretionary ground for recognition, while 
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generally enforceable in United States courts, domestic judgments remain 
more difficult to enforce abroad.  Four reasons are commonly given for this 
disparate treatment of American judgments: (1) exorbitant bases of 
personal jurisdiction (for example, long arm “doing business” jurisdiction, 
or physical presence, also known as “tag” jurisdiction), (2) “excessive” jury 
awards, (3) the public policy of the forum, and (4) punitive damages.8  This 
asymmetrical enforcement similarly disadvantages Americans. 
These transnational problems are ripe for an international solution.  
Over the last two decades, the United States and its fellow Hague 
Convention member states have negotiated a proposed Hague Convention 
on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
(Hague Judgments Convention), which would have not only made 
enforcement of domestic judgments in foreign courts more likely, but 
would have also included a basis for establishing personal jurisdiction over 
foreign product manufacturers.9 The Hague Judgments Convention, 
however, seems unlikely ever to become law and, even if it did, it would 
suffer from constitutional infirmities.  Our fellow Hague member states 
have a strong disincentive to come to an agreement on the Hague 
Judgments Convention because they benefit from the asymmetrical burdens 
and advantages that the American rules of personal jurisdiction and 
judgment enforcement currently create. 
Congress should adopt legislation that will, as far as possible, create 
incentives for our fellow Hague Convention partners to adopt the Hague 
Judgments Convention, with some modifications. Congress recently 
considered the Foreign Manufacturers Liability Accountability Act 
(FMLAA), an admirable yet flawed resolution to the imbalance in personal 
 
Georgia and Massachusetts make it a mandatory ground.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481 cmt. d (noting that the reciprocity requirement 
in Hilton is no longer followed in a majority of state and federal courts in the United States). 
 8.  See Committee on Foreign and Comparative Law, Survey on Foreign Recognition of U.S. 
Money Judgments, 56 THE RECORD OF THE ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 378, 381–86, 409–
10 (2001), available at http://www2.nycbar.org/Publications/record/ [hereinafter Survey on Foreign 
Recognition]; SAMUEL BAUMGARTNER, THE PROPOSED HAGUE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND 
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS, TRANS-ATLANTIC LAWMAKING FOR TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 184–85 
(2003); Arthur Anyuan Yuan, Enforcing and Collecting Money Judgments in China from A U.S. 
Judgment Creditor’s Perspective, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 757, 759 (2004). 
 9.  See Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, art. 10(1), adopted on Oct. 30, 1999, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/ 
wop/jdgmpd11.pdf [hereinafter Preliminary Draft Convention] (establishing the occurrence of an injury 
in the forum as a permissible basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction: “A plaintiff may bring an 
action in tort or delict in the courts of the State . . . in which the injury arose . . . .”); see also 
BAUMGARTNER, supra note 8, at 3–4 (describing this jurisdictional basis in the Hague Judgments 
Convention). 
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jurisdiction.10 The FMLAA would have required foreign manufacturers to 
designate an agent for service of process in one state as a condition of that 
manufacturer’s product being distributed or sold in the United States.11  
The FMLAA also equated the act of designating an agent with consenting 
to personal jurisdiction in the courts of that state.12 Fortunately, the 
FMLAA did not pass because it suffers from a number of flaws, the most 
significant of which is the way it reinforces a race to the bottom.13  
Manufacturers that must designate an agent in only one state will rationally 
choose the state with the most manufacturer-friendly tort laws or juries, or 
perhaps the most geographically inconvenient state for consumers such as 
Alaska or Hawaii. A simple change in language can rectify these 
shortcomings.  Congress should revise the FMLAA to require foreign 
manufacturers to consent to jurisdiction in any court that is an otherwise 
proper venue, for example, where the accident or injury occurred.  
Congress has the authority to accomplish this because the FMLAA is a 
constitutional exercise of Congress’ authority under the Foreign Commerce 
Clause.14  The FMLAA may also be justified in terms of the federal 
government’s authority over foreign relations.15 
Congress should also adopt the American Law Institute’s (ALI) 
proposed Federal Judgment Recognition and Enforcement Act (FJREA), 
 
 10.  See Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act, S. 1946, 112th Cong. (2011) 
[hereinafter FMLAA]. 
 11.  Id. § 5. 
 12.  Id. § 5(c)(1). 
 13.  See id. §§ 5(a)(2), (c)(1) (requiring that the agent be designated in a single state of the 
manufacturer’s choosing, limited only to the fact that the state have a “substantial connection” to the 
product and equating that designation to consent to personal jurisdiction in that state). 
 14.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-
Judgments in the United States: In Search of Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 253, 257 (1991) [hereinafter Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments]. 
 15.  See Ralph U. Whitten, U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine and Forum Shopping, International 
and Domestic (Revisited), 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 559, 582 n.133 (2002) (“Although Congress possesses 
enumerated powers that would support [the ALI’s draft FJREA] in some of its applications, such as the 
foreign commerce power, the implied power over foreign affairs might be necessary to sustain 
application of the legislation to all cases.”) (citation omitted); see also Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal 
Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1634–35 (1997) (“Such suits typically 
implicate issues that fall in the gray zone between substance and procedure: transnational choice of law, 
transnational forum non conveniens, the enforcement of transnational forum selection clauses, and the 
recognition of foreign judgments. These issues are not governed by enacted federal law. The question 
thus arises whether they are governed by state law or federal common law. The Supreme Court has not 
resolved this question.  But some lower courts have ruled that these issues implicate federal foreign 
relations interests and should be governed by the federal common law of foreign relations.  
Commentators overwhelmingly agree with this conclusion.”); see also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 16–22, 70–72 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing the unenumerated foreign 
affairs power of Congress). 
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which reincorporates a version of the Hilton Court’s reciprocity 
requirement.16  Under the FJREA, if the party opposing the foreign 
judgment can raise substantial doubt that a foreign court would enforce a 
similar judgment rendered in this country, our courts shall not enforce the 
foreign judgment.17  These two alterations of the status quo can help create 
incentives for foreign countries to return to the negotiating table.  In the 
interim, and to the extent that these incentives are insufficient to fully 
accomplish the goals of reducing these asymmetries, the proposed 
legislation will resolve much of the unfairness to American businesses and 
consumers. 
The Hague Judgments Convention as currently conceived, however, is 
not without flaws.  To achieve parity in personal jurisdiction, the precise 
wording of the treaty must be changed.  Even if the Convention had been 
ratified as currently drafted, its basis for personal jurisdiction in many 
product claims—establishing personal jurisdiction in any court having 
jurisdiction over the place where the harmful event occurred—was likely 
unconstitutional. Treaties remain subordinate to the United States 
Constitution, and any treaty provision inconsistent with the Due Process 
Clause of the Constitution will most likely fail Supreme Court scrutiny.18  
Because the mere occurrence of a harmful event in the jurisdiction is not a 
sufficient “minimum contact” to confer personal jurisdiction under the Due 
Process Clause,19 the Hague Judgments Convention would likely conflict 
with the Constitution in the very circumstances it was intended to 
reconcile.  As a result, the Convention should be revised before it can be 
adopted. 
To achieve consistency with the Due Process Clause, the Hague 
Judgments Convention should utilize the concept of consent as the basis for 
personal jurisdiction, much as the FMLAA proposed. Under the Due 
Process Clause, personal jurisdiction is a personal right, which may be 
waived.  Consent is, and always has been, a valid exception to an otherwise 
insurmountable personal jurisdiction objection.  The United States and our 
Hague Convention partners have, as sovereign powers, the authority to 
 
 16.  RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FED. 
STATUTE § 7, at 92 (2006). 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1957) (holding that treaties must comply with the 
Constitution). 
 19.  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295–97 (1980) (collecting cases 
and explaining how the occurrence of an injury in a location is not sufficient to establish personal 
jurisdiction); see also, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) 
(“[F]oreseeability of causing injury in another State . . . is not a sufficient benchmark for exercising 
personal jurisdiction.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
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require their respective constituents to consent to jurisdiction as part of a 
treaty.  As a result, the Hague Judgments Convention can be reworded to 
address the asymmetries of personal jurisdiction and judgment enforcement 
without running afoul of the Constitution. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S INCOHERENT STREAM OF 
COMMERCE DOCTRINE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
INADVERTENTLY PROTECTS FOREIGN MANUFACTURERS AT 
THE EXPENSE OF AMERICAN CONSUMERS AND BUSINESSES 
A. American courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident only when the nonresident has sufficient “minimum 
contacts” with the forum state. 
In the United States, personal jurisdiction is a constitutional limit on a 
court’s power to adjudicate the rights and responsibilities of a defendant in 
a civil action.20 Before a court may acquire jurisdiction over the 
defendant’s person, due process requires that a nonresident defendant 
“have certain minimum contacts” with the forum state “such that 
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.”21  In analyzing “minimum contacts,” a court focuses on 
the relationship between each particular defendant’s actions and the forum 
state.22 Indeed, “[t]he unilateral activity of those who claim some 
relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of 
contact with the forum State . . . . [It] is essential in each case that there be 
 
 20.  See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 609 (1990); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 
732 (1878); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2) (stating that as a practical matter, personal jurisdiction is a 
defense to an action that that must be raised pre-answer or waived). Whether this limitation is premised 
on notions of sovereignty or territorial limits of the state on the one hand, or the personal liberty 
interests of defendant on the other is debatable. Compare Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) 
(“[Due process] restrictions are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant 
litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.”), with 
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (explaining 
that the Due Process Clause “represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, 
but as a matter of individual liberty.”), and Walden v. Fiore, No. 12–574, slip op. at 5, (U.S. Feb. 25, 
2014) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment constrains a State’s authority to bind a 
nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts.”). 
 21.  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 22.  Id. at 319 (“Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature 
of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of 
the due process clause to insure. That clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a 
judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, 
ties, or relations.”) (emphasis added); see also Walden, No. 12–574  at 7–8 (explaining that the relevant 
analysis focuses not only on the defendant’s contacts, but also the defendant’s contacts with the State, 
as opposed to persons in the State). 
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some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege 
of conducting activities within the forum State . . . .”23  This focus on the 
particular defendant’s “purposeful availment” discounts or even ignores the 
actions of third parties, including parties in contractual privity with the 
defendant such as distributors, or parties closely related to the defendant 
such as wholly-owned subsidiaries.24 As a result, the fact that a 
manufacturer hopes, desires, or even expects the stream of commerce to 
carry its product to the forum state—when the product not only ends up in 
the State, but injures someone there—is generally insufficient to establish 
jurisdiction over the defendant. 
B. The Supreme Court’s stream of commerce decisions make 
establishing jurisdiction over nonresident product manufacturer 
defendants difficult or even impossible. 
Over the last three decades, the stream of commerce metaphor has 
failed to bring “a degree of predictability to the legal system” that the Due 
Process Clause was designed to foster.25  In 1980, the concept debuted in 
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson.26  In World-Wide Volkswagen, a 
New York resident bought a brand new Audi from Seaway Volkswagen in 
New York.  While driving the Audi on a family trip through Oklahoma, the 
Woodsons were rear-ended and a fire broke out, seriously burning Mrs. 
Woodson and her children.  The family sued the German manufacturer, 
Audi; the American importer, Volkswagen of America; the regional 
distributor, World-Wide Volkswagen; and the retailer, Seaway 
Volkswagen, all in Oklahoma state court. The regional distributor and 
retailer objected to personal jurisdiction and the Supreme Court agreed that 
neither was subject to the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma courts. 
The Supreme Court analyzed World-Wide Volkswagen and Seaway 
Volkswagen’s actions in relation to Oklahoma and concluded that neither 
 
 23.  Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 (emphasis added); see Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (“Jurisdiction is 
proper, however, where the contacts proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that 
create a substantial connection with the forum State.”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 24.  See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781, n.13 (1984) (requiring that forum 
contacts of parent corporation and of wholly-owned subsidiary be assessed individually); see also 
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (assuming that a distributor’s contacts may be 
imputable to the parent corporation defendant for purposes of establishing general jurisdiction, but 
finding insufficient contacts in any event). 
 25.  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
 26.  See id. at 297–98 (“The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause 
if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of 
commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.”). 
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had minimum contacts with the State.  Both were New York corporations, 
and neither conducted any business in Oklahoma, including advertising, 
selling, or shipping products to Oklahoma or its residents.27  The only 
connection to Oklahoma arose from the actions of the consumer driving the 
vehicle there.28  The Court left open, however, the prospect that personal 
jurisdiction would be permissible where the defendant’s actions attempt to 
serve the market in a state “directly or indirectly,”29 stating: “[t]he forum 
State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts 
personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the 
stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by 
consumers in the forum State.”30 
This dicta from World-Wide Volkswagen suggests that even indirect 
efforts to serve the forum state and the expectation that the stream of 
commerce will carry the product to the state’s consumers, could justify an 
assertion of personal jurisdiction. It seems to leave the door open for the 
stream of commerce to carry a defendant into the forum state’s courts. 
Seven years later, in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, the 
Court cast considerable doubt on the “stream of commerce” as a viable 
jurisdictional theory.31  The unusual factual scenario, however, left open 
the possibility that the stream of commerce may have increased relevance 
under different circumstances.  Asahi began as a product liability action 
brought in California state court by a motorcycle rider against the 
manufacturer of one of the motorcycle’s tire tubes, Cheng Shin, a 
Taiwanese corporation.32  Cheng Shin in turn sought indemnification from 
the tire tube’s valve manufacturer, Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., a 
Japanese corporation.33  The motorcycle rider settled with all defendants, 
leaving only the cross-claim between Cheng Shin and Asahi.34  The Court 
unanimously agreed that a California state court’s exercise of jurisdiction 
over a dispute between a Japanese valve manufacturer and a Taiwanese tire 
tube manufacturer—neither of whom solicited business in or made direct 
sales to California—would, irrespective of Asahi’s contacts with the forum, 
be “unreasonable and unfair” under the circumstances.35  The Court was 
 
 27.  Id. at 287–89, 295. 
 28.  Id. at 289. 
 29.  Id. at 297 (emphasis added). 
 30.  Id. at 297–98. 
 31.  See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 111 (1987). 
 32.  Id. at 106. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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unable, however, to fashion a majority opinion agreeing on the precise 
contours of the minimum contacts test as applied to foreign product 
manufacturers whose products predictably, and perhaps even intentionally, 
wind up in the forum state.  The fractured nature of the Court’s opinions 
left some hope that different facts would make different law. 
The Court was split on the central question of whether the 
manufacturer’s admitted awareness that its products would be purchased by 
consumers in the forum state, coupled with the fact that the stream of 
commerce indeed carried the product into the forum state, would justify an 
assertion of personal jurisdiction.36  Justice O’Connor, writing for a four-
Justice bloc, explained that mere awareness is not tantamount to purposeful 
availment; hence, Asahi’s awareness that Cheng Shin sold its products in 
California was not “an action of the defendant purposefully directed 
toward the forum State.”37 Justice O’Connor’s formulation requires 
“additional conduct” and has come to be known as the “stream of 
commerce plus” test: 
Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or 
purpose to serve the market in the forum State, for example, 
designing the product for the market in the forum State, advertising 
in the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular 
advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product 
through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in 
the forum State. But a defendant’s awareness that the stream of 
commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does 
not convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream into 
an act purposefully directed toward the forum State.38 
Justice O’Connor found the additional conduct purposefully directed 
at the forum state lacking on these facts. 
Justice Brennan, writing for another four-Justice bloc, found 
purposeful availment not in Asahi’s mere awareness of Cheng Shin’s 
conduct, but Asahi’s conduct in light of its awareness.39  Justice Brennan 
quoted approvingly the above-referenced dicta from World-Wide 
Volkswagen that even indirect efforts to serve a market, coupled with the 
expectation that the product will be purchased in the forum state, is 
sufficient contact with the forum state for due process purposes.40  Justice 
Brennan focused on Asahi’s repeated and extensive sales to Cheng Shin, all 
 
 36.  Id. at 112 (majority opinion); id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 121–22 (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
 37.  Id. at 112 (majority opinion) (emphasis in original). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 40.  Id. at 119–20. 
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while knowing that Cheng Shin was selling Asahi’s products in the United 
States, including California. Unlike Justice O’Connor, Justice Brennan saw 
“no need for such a showing” of “additional conduct”; Asahi’s conduct was 
sufficient to constitute “purposeful availment.”41  For nearly twenty-five 
years, lower courts struggled with the application of these two tests.42 
These two competing visions of the stream of commerce converged 
again in the Court’s most recent pronouncement in Nicastro.43  The 
plaintiff, Nicastro, seriously injured his hand in a metal-shearing machine 
while working in New Jersey.44  J. McIntyre manufactured the machine in 
the United Kingdom, and sold the machine through an independent 
distributor throughout the United States.45  This particular machine was the 
only one sold in New Jersey.46  The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld 
personal jurisdiction over the U.K. company and the Supreme Court 
reversed.47  Once again, the Court was unable to fashion a majority opinion 
describing the limits of personal jurisdiction in stream of commerce cases. 
Four members of the Court essentially endorsed Justice O’Connor’s 
“stream of commerce plus” test, requiring additional conduct by the 
defendant that is purposefully directed at the forum state.48 Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the plurality, focused specifically on J. McIntyre’s 
conduct, whether phrased as “purposeful availment,” “activity directed at 
the sovereign,” or “a course of conduct directed at the society or economy 
existing within the jurisdiction of a given sovereign.”49 The plurality 
stressed that “an independent company agreed to sell J. McIntyre’s 
machines in the United States” and “J. McIntyre itself did not sell its 
machines to buyers in this country beyond the U.S. distributor . . . .”50  
Though Justice Kennedy acknowledged that selling through a distributor 
who serves the entire United States may demonstrate an intent to serve the 
U.S. as a whole, he emphasized that J. McIntyre did not advertise or market 
in, send or ship to, or otherwise target New Jersey.51 
The two concurring Justices declined (at least facially) to decide 
 
 41.  Id. at 117. 
 42.  Alison G. Myhra, Civil Procedure, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 689, 705-06 n.120 (2007) 
(collecting cases applying the two competing tests). 
 43.  131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 44.  Id. at 2786. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at 2790. 
 49.  Id. at 2787–89. 
 50.  Id. at 2786 (emphasis added). 
 51.  Id. at 2785–86. 
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between the two competing tests.52  Instead, they focused on the fact that 
there was no “stream of commerce” to begin with; the “stream” was nary a 
trickle.53  Indeed, the record reflected that only a single machine was sold 
in New Jersey.54  The concurring Justices were persuaded that, whether 
foreseeability or additional conduct is required, a single sale in the forum 
state is not even a “stream” of commerce that can justify New Jersey’s 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over the foreign manufacturer.55 
The dissent recognized the implications of the common ground 
between the plurality and concurring opinions: a foreign manufacturer that 
not only foresaw, but intended that its products would end up in the United 
States, can “Pilate-like wash its hands of a product by having independent 
distributors market it.”56  At least six members of the Court acknowledged 
that the U.K. manufacturer specifically intended that its products end up in 
the United States.57  Essentially, the distributor, by making the actual sale, 
insulated J. McIntyre from the jurisdiction of the New Jersey court.58  
Although all nine members of the Court apparently believed J. McIntyre 
“purposefully availed” itself of the United States market, no state 
apparently would be able to exercise jurisdiction over J. McIntyre.59 
C. The “stream of commerce” doctrine encourages foreign 
manufacturers to avoid establishing “minimum contacts” with any 
American state by using distributors or other intermediaries. 
Foreign product manufacturers that sell their products in the United 
States through distributors, subsidiaries, or affiliates can take advantage of 
the Supreme Court’s stream of commerce doctrine to reduce the risk that a 
court will find minimum contacts with the forum state.60 While the 
dissenters in Nicastro bemoan the specter of foreign manufacturers using 
intermediaries to avoid American personal jurisdiction, in truth the 
fractured nature of Asahi encouraged this result nearly twenty-five years 
earlier.  Justice O’Connor’s more restrictive stream of commerce plus test 
 
 52.  Id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. at 2795 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted). 
 57.  Id. at 2790–91 (plurality opinion). 
 58.  Id. at 2795 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 59.  Id. at 279–91, 2794 (plurality opinion). 
 60.  See Taylor Simpson-Wood, In the Aftermath of Goodyear Dunlop: Oyez! Oyez! Oyez! A Call 
for A Hybrid Approach to Personal Jurisdiction in International Products Liability Controversies, 64 
BAYLOR L. REV. 113, 131 (2012) (“The U.S. distributor serves as a ‘middleman,’ thereby permitting a 
foreign manufacturer to claim ignorance of the ultimate destinations for its products.”). 
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appeared to embrace assertions of jurisdiction over product manufacturers 
that “market[] the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as 
the sales agent in the forum State.”  While this dictum may seem to permit 
jurisdiction over manufacturers that make use of distributors, the key to the 
phrase appears to be the agency relationship.  Most foreign manufacturers, 
however, are careful to avoid entering into distribution arrangements in 
which the distributor becomes the agent of the manufacturer.61 
Though lower courts have been far from uniform in their 
interpretation and application of Asahi, the majority of courts around the 
country have followed Justice O’Connor’s formulation, creating difficult 
procedural hurdles for plaintiffs injured in this country by a foreign 
manufacturer’s products.62  Courts applying the stream of commerce plus 
test have often found personal jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers 
lacking.63 Justice O’Connor’s opinion explicitly encourages this—she cited 
Hutson v. Fehr Brothers, Inc., a case in which the Eighth Circuit held that 
layers of independent distributors could shield a foreign manufacturer from 
jurisdiction.64  In many of the cases that follow Justice O’Connor’s stream 
of commerce plus test, foreign manufacturers were able to effectively 
insulate themselves from American law by using an intermediary to access 
the American market, such as a distributor, retailer, or even a wholly-
owned subsidiary.65  And, as Justice Ginsburg acknowledged, Nicastro 
 
 61.  See Brief of the Prod. Liab. Advisory Council, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, J. 
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (No. 09-1343), 13432010 WL 4717267 at *18 
(Nov. 19, 2010) (citing 1 W.M. GARNER, FRANCHISE & DISTRIBUTION LAW & PRACTICE § 3:6, at 90 
(2010) (“The dealer or distributor agreement usually provides that the dealer is an independent 
contractor and that neither party is the agent of the other for any purpose.”)). 
 62.  Popper, supra note 1, at 223 (“While a number of courts have elected to follow Justice 
Brennan’s concurrence in Asahi, the majority follow Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion, resulting in a 
far more difficult jurisdictional challenge for injured plaintiffs.”). 
 63.  Id. at 225 (“[E]ven when a foreign manufacturer’s products foreseeably enter the stream of 
commerce in the United States, generate a profit for the manufacturer, and proximately cause harm, the 
manufacturer stands a very good chance of avoiding responsibility when those products injure or kill 
U.S. consumers.”). 
 64.  See Hutson v. Fehr Bros., 584 F.2d 833, 837 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978). 
 65.  See, e.g., Kozial v. Bombardier-Rotax GmbH, 129 F. App’x 543, 547 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(independent distributor); Jennings v. AC Hydraulic A/S, 383 F.3d 546, 550–51 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(independent distributor); Zombeck v. Amada Co., CIV. A. 06-953, 2007 WL 4105231, at *6 (W.D. Pa. 
Nov. 15, 2007) (wholly-owned subsidiary); Cupp v. Alberto-Culver USA, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 873, 
878–79 (W.D. Tenn. 2004) (wholly-owned subsidiary); Affatato v. Hazer-Werk, CIV.A. 01-CV-4345, 
2003 WL 22797786, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2003) (independent distributor); Savage v. Scripto-Tokai 
Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 86, 92–94 (D. Conn. 2001) (wholly-owned subsidiary); Envirotech 
Pumpsystems, Inc. v. Sterling Fluid Sys., 2:99CV814K, 2000 WL 35459756, at *4–5 (D. Utah Nov. 16, 
2000) (independent distributor); Juelich v. Yamazaki Mazak Optonics Corp., 682 N.W. 2d 565, 572 
(Minn. 2004) (independent distributor); Vargas v. Hong Jin Crown Corp., 636 N.W.2d 291, 301–02 
(Mich. App. 2001) (independent distributor); Bedrejo v. Triple E Canada, Ltd., 984 P.2d 739, 742 
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exacerbates this problem; many lower courts continue to hold that foreign 
manufacturers are insulated from American assertions of personal 
jurisdiction.66 
This result seems intentional. The Supreme Court has always 
recognized that parties can structure their conduct to avoid personal 
jurisdiction in the United States.67  The Court has explicitly stated that the 
Due Process Clause is intended to “ensur[e] the ‘orderly administration of 
the laws,’” and give “a degree of predictability to the legal system that 
allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some 
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them 
liable to suit.”68 
D. The net effect of American personal jurisdiction rules is that 
foreign manufacturers can significantly discount the cost of 
complying with American tort law. 
Professor Buehler’s recent and thorough economic analysis of the 
stream of commerce doctrine demonstrates how our jurisdictional rules 
reduce the deterrent effect of American tort law on foreign product 
manufacturers.69  Defendants need not universally prevail on jurisdictional 
 
(Mont. 1999) (nationwide retailers); CMMC v. Salinas, 929 S.W.2d 435, 439–40 (Tex. 1996) 
(independent distributor); Hapner v. Solis Apparatus Manufactories, Ltd., 411 N.W.2d 439, 447–50 
(Mich. 1987) (independent distributor). 
 66.  See, e.g., Monge v. RG Petro-Mach. (Group) Co., 701 F.3d 598, 618 (10th Cir. 2012); Fed. 
Ins. Co. v. Steris Corp., No. 11-CV-00078 SRN/AJB, 2012 WL 5187790, at *7-8 (D. Minn. Oct. 19, 
2012) (independent distributor); Sieg v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 855 F. Supp. 2d 320, 323, 328 (M.D. Pa. 
2012) (independent distributor), recon. denied, No. 3:10CV606, 2012 WL 1657921 (M.D. Pa. May 11, 
2012); Eskridge v. Pacific Cycle, Inc., 2:11-CV-00615, 2012 WL 1036826 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 27, 2012) 
(independent distributor); Windsor v. Spinner Indus. Co., 825 F. Supp. 2d 640, 644 (D. Md. 2011); 
Dow Chem. Canada ULC v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 4th 170, 174 (2011) (independent 
distributor), modified (Dec. 21, 2011), rev. denied (Apr. 18, 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 427 (2012); 
Dierig v. Lees Leisure Indus., Ltd., 830 F. Supp. 2d 330, 339 (E.D. Ky. 2011), order vacated on recon., 
CIV.A. 11-125-DLB, 2012 WL 669968 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 28, 2012); Graham v. Hamilton, CIV.A. 11-609, 
2012 WL 893751 (W.D. La. Jan. 31, 2012), report and recommendation rejected, CIV.A. 3:11-609, 
2012 WL 893748 (W.D. La. Mar. 15, 2012); Moore v. R.G. Brinkmann Co., 3:11-CV-208 JPG-PMF, 
2012 WL 407203, *1 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2012); Gardner v. SPX Corp., 272 P.3d 175, 182 (Utah Ct. App. 
2012) (independent distributor); Brem v. Weinstein Co., B227245, 2012 WL 1130207 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Apr. 2, 2012) (unpublished opinion); Viator v. HTC Holding, 04-12-00447-CV, 2012 WL 5984700 *6–
7 (Tex. App. Ct. Nov. 28, 2012); see also Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Kathleen L. Blaner, The Anti-
Competitive Impact of U.S. Product Liability Laws: Are Foreign Businesses Beating Us at Our Own 
Game?, 9 J.L. & COM. 167, 180 (1989) (“[f]oreign manufacturers . . . are not equally subject to the 
jurisdiction of U.S. courts, and therefore, may not be subject to U.S. product liability laws . . . .”). 
 67.  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (citing cases back to 
International Shoe). 
 68.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 69.  Buehler, supra note 1. 
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challenges to receive some benefit from our restrictive personal jurisdiction 
doctrine because the unpredictable stream of commerce doctrine 
encourages defendants to make challenges to personal jurisdiction, even 
when they are not assured of success.70  Even when a foreign manufacturer 
unsuccessfully challenges personal jurisdiction, such challenges consume 
inordinate amounts of time and resources, increasing the plaintiff’s costs, 
and creating pressure to settle or an incentive to forgo suing in the first 
place.71 And when a defendant successfully challenges personal 
jurisdiction, the plaintiff’s case comes to a complete halt, even though 
personal jurisdiction has nothing to do with the merits of his claim.  Even if 
the plaintiff successfully obtains a finding of jurisdiction in the trial court, 
given the fact that such a finding is not immediately appealable,72 the 
plaintiff risks wasting substantial amounts of time and money trying the 
case to a final judgment only to face the daunting prospect of starting 
over.73  As a result, the stream of commerce doctrine both increases a 
plaintiff’s costs, and reduces the chance he will be successful against 
foreign manufacturers.74 
The net effect of the increased risk and cost to plaintiffs is that foreign 
manufacturers can discount the likelihood of being successfully haled 
before an American court, because plaintiffs have less incentive to sue and 
 
70.Id. at 109 (“[O]ur current personal jurisdiction rules misalign litigation incentives in a socially 
undesirable way. Unclear and restrictive jurisdictional rules increase the likelihood of procedural 
disputes, inflate litigation costs, and decrease the expected benefit from suit, making it less likely that 
plaintiffs will file lawsuits. This in turn increases the likelihood that injurers will escape liability and 
will be inadequately deterred from engaging in wrongful conduct.”). 
71.  Id. at 129 (“These jurisdictional disputes inflate litigation costs. Parties and the courts allocate 
significant resources to motions to dismiss and other procedural disputes.”) (citing Jayne S. Ressler, 
Plausibly Pleading Personal Jurisdiction, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 627, 634 (2009)); Philip Y. Brown, A 
Client’s Guide to the Litigation Process, in ADDRESSING A CLIENT’S LITIGATION ISSUES 31, 40 (Eddie 
Fournier ed., 2008) (“Motions to dismiss are expensive to draft and respond to, and they can cause 
substantial delays while the motion is briefed, heard by the court, and ruled upon.”); see also Katherine 
C. Sheehan, Predicting the Future: Personal Jurisdiction for the Twenty-First Century, 66 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 385, 440 (1998) (arguing for the need to streamline personal jurisdiction determinations to avoid 
“expensive and burdensome motion practice”). 
 72. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (granting federal appellate court jurisdiction for “final 
decisions”); see also Patrick J. Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism: International Shoe’s Half-Buried 
Legacy, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 561, 583 (1995) (“[A]n appeal on the jurisdictional issue does not lie 
until there is a final judgment in the case.”). 
 73.  Buehler, supra note 1, at 134 (quoting Hoagland v. Sandberg, Phoenix & Von Gontard, P.C., 
385 F.3d 737, 739–40 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he parties will often find themselves having to start their 
litigation over from the beginning, perhaps after it has gone all the way through to judgment.”); 
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818 (1988) (“Parties often spend years 
litigating claims only to learn that their efforts and expense were wasted in a court that lacked 
jurisdiction.”)). 
 74.  Buehler, supra note 1, at 131. 
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a lower probability of success when they do.  And with a lower risk of 
being subject to an American court’s jurisdiction, the foreign manufacturer 
can discount the cost of being found liable for violating American tort law.  
Thus, a foreign manufacturer does not bear the same costs an American 
manufacturer must bear. 
E. American consumers injured in this country by foreign 
manufacturers that are not subject to American personal 
jurisdiction have no viable alternative remedy. 
If an American court sustains a foreign manufacturer’s objection to 
personal jurisdiction, the case against that defendant is over.  As a practical 
matter, the American consumer will be left without a remedy.  Only in the 
abstract can the consumer bring a claim against the manufacturer in its 
home jurisdiction or recover against the local dealer or distributor who is 
likely subject to personal jurisdiction. 
1. A foreign forum is likely not an adequate substitute for an 
American consumer. 
A consumer faced with the additional time and expense of prosecuting 
her claim overseas will likely find the cost so prohibitive that she will be 
unlikely to bring such a claim. Even where a consumer may desire to bring 
a claim in a foreign forum, foreign procedure and substantive tort law are 
often less favorable to consumers than U.S. tort law and procedure.  For 
example, plaintiffs in the American tort system have the prospect of 
generally higher damages than tort plaintiffs in other countries.75  In the 
European Union, for example, a plaintiff’s product liability claim is subject 
to more defenses, and damages are more circumscribed.76  Claimants in the 
United States can try their product liability cases before a jury, while 
judges are the decision-makers in judicial systems in the rest of the world.77  
 
 75.  See, e.g., Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European Products Liability More 
Protective Than the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 985, 1029 
(1998); Mark A. Behrens & Daniel H. Raddock, Japan’s New Product Liability Law: The Citadel of 
Strict Liability Falls, but Access to Recovery Is Limited by Formidable Barriers, 16 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. 
L. 669, 711 (1995); Patrick Thieffry et al., Strict Product Liability in the EEC: Implementation, 
Practice and Impact on U.S. Manufacturers of Directive 85/374, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 65, 90 (1989); 
Lord Griffiths et al., Developments in English Product Liability Law: A Comparison with the American 
System, 62 TUL. L. REV. 353, 401 (1988). 
 76.  Andrew C. Spacone, Strict Liability in the European Union-Not A United States Analog, 5 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 341, 346 (2000) (“The fact is that the procedural and substantive hurdles 
to successful products litigation in the European Union are considerably higher than in the United 
States.”); see also Howells & Mildred, supra note 75, at 1029; Behrens & Raddock, supra note 75, at 
711; Thieffry et al., supra note 75, at 90; Griffiths, supra note 75, at 401. 
 77.  See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 n.18 (1981) (describing juries as more 
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American plaintiffs and defendants tend to agree that, on average, plaintiffs 
fare better with juries than with judges on questions of liability and 
damages.78  And unlike their continental counterparts, American plaintiffs 
generally have access to wide-ranging discovery that is crucial to 
establishing a product defect in the first place.79 
The American rules governing lawyer compensation are also more 
favorable to claimants.  The vast majority of plaintiffs in the United States 
compensate their lawyers using pure contingent fee agreements, which are 
not available in other countries.80  For example, Japanese law requires the 
plaintiff to pay her lawyer an up-front retainer fee in addition to a 
contingent fee.81  The retainer fee is set at a percentage of the claimed 
damages and is substantial enough to render “legal representation 
unaffordable for many.”82  In the United States, by contrast, claimants can 
rely on their counsel both to fund the litigation and bear the risk of an 
unsuccessful outcome. Other countries, particularly England, further 
discourage litigation by requiring the losing party to bear the costs of an 
unsuccessful claim.83 
2. The local distributor or other intermediary who may be subject to 
personal jurisdiction in the United States is not an adequate 
substitute defendant. 
The local distributor is not, as industry spokesmen suggest,84 an 
adequate substitute defendant, even though the distributor theoretically may 
be subject to American product liability law.85  First, the local distributor is 
inadequate for discovery purposes. It is difficult to overstate the importance 
of design, testing, and manufacturing documents in product liability 
cases.86 By definition, the foreign manufacturer—not the local distributor—
 
plaintiff-friendly and generally unavailable in civil law countries). 
 78.  See Kevin M. Clermont, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1124, 1162–63 (1992). 
 79.  See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 252 n.18; see also Behrens & Raddock, supra note 75, at 706; 
Thieffry, supra note 75, at 88; Griffiths, supra note 75, at 402. 
 80.  See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 252 n.18. 
 81.  Behrens & Raddock, supra note 75, at 709. 
 82.  Id. at 710. 
 83.  Griffiths, supra note 75, at 401. 
 84.  Brief for the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner, J. McIntyre Machine, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2010) (No. 09-13432010), 2010 WL 
4717267, at *23–24 (“Indeed, having sellers and distributors available in the United States as strict 
liability defendants may even increase the likelihood of recovery, given the difficulties that can attend 
the collection of judgments from foreign defendants.”). 
 85.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
 86.  Francis H. Hare, Jr., Discovery in Products Liability Cases: The Plaintiff’s Plea for Judicial 
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manufactured (and likely designed and tested) the allegedly defective 
product.  As a result, these crucial documents will be, for all practical 
purposes, beyond the reach of the American plaintiff because the local 
distributor does not have possession, custody, or control over these vital 
documents and information.87 
The local distributor is also inadequate because he is more likely to 
escape liability altogether.  First, approximately half of all United States 
jurisdictions have adopted innocent seller defenses that immunize a non-
manufacturing seller or distributor from liability.88  Next, jurors are human 
beings. They understandably consider blameworthiness in strict liability 
cases, even though fault may not technically be relevant.89  Distributors 
capitalize on human nature and will often defend a product liability claim 
on the basis that they did not design, test, or manufacture the product and, 
as a result, could not have made any decision that would have changed the 
outcome.  The local distributor is also more likely to be a local business, 
and consequently a more sympathetic defendant than an overseas, foreign 
manufacturer. 
F. American manufacturers do not compete on a level playing field. 
Unlike foreign manufacturers, American manufacturers cannot avoid 
domestic tort law; the concept of general personal jurisdiction ensures that 
some American court will have personal jurisdiction over a domestic 
manufacturer.90  At the same time, American manufacturers may find it 
 
Understanding, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 413, 415–16 (1989) (“Defective products cases invariably 
involve numerous highly technical documents pertaining to the development, design, manufacture, and 
distribution of the defendant’s product. These documents are at the center of the distinctive discovery 
problems that arise in products liability cases. The collective importance of such documents is 
undisputed and constitutes the single most important body of evidence in a products case. Indeed, the 
contents of these documents are relevant not only to the defendant’s liability but also to virtually every 
issue in the case. The plaintiff’s attorney cannot adequately prepare his client’s case until he obtains 
these documents. The problem, for the plaintiff, is that the entire body of needed documentation is 
exclusively in the defendant’s possession.”). 
 87.  See, e.g., U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n v. ASAT, Inc., 411 F.3d 245, 254 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (non-
party exclusive distributor was not shown to be in control of patent-related documents held by its parent 
corporation); Micron Tech., Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 2006 WL 1646133, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (the 
subpoenaed party, a wholly owned U.S. distributor of a foreign manufacturer, did not have to produce 
documents in the possession and control of the foreign manufacturer). 
 88.  Robert A. Sachs, Product Liability Reform and Seller Liability: A Proposal for Change, 55 
BAYLOR L. REV. 1031, 1121–36 (2003). 
 89.  See Richard L. Cupp Jr. & Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability Versus 
Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 874, 902 (2002). 
 90.  George L. Priest, Lawyers, Liability, and Law Reform: Effects on American Economic 
Growth and Trade Competitiveness, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 115, 147 (1993) (“To the extent that foreign 
manufacturers can discount the collectability of U.S. products liability judgments, however, their prices 
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difficult to avoid foreign tort law because other countries do not have a 
similarly restrictive view of personal jurisdiction.  For example, through 
the Brussels Convention, European law vests jurisdiction in the court where 
the injury occurred.91  Unlike U.S. procedure, European procedure permits 
a plaintiff to sue in the court located where the injury occurred, without 
regard to whether the defendant had sufficient “contact” with that location.  
As a result, American manufacturers must consider the cost of complying 
with both domestic and foreign tort law while foreign manufacturers can 
reduce the risk of being subject to American tort law.92 
II. AMERICAN COURTS ARE GENERALLY RECEPTIVE TO 
FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS EVEN THOUGH FOREIGN 
COURTS ARE LESS LIKELY TO ENFORCE AMERICAN MONEY 
JUDGMENTS 
A. Foreign judgments are relatively easy to enforce in the United 
States. 
State law governs whether a foreign judgment is enforceable and does 
not pose much of a barrier to enforcement.  No treaty or federal statute 
currently governs whether a foreign judgment can be enforced in the 
United States.  As a result, judgment enforcement is a matter of state law, 
which is hardly uniform across the states.  Foreign litigants who wish to 
enforce their judgments in an American court must comply with various 
statutory and common law rules.  Despite the patchwork quilt of applicable 
 
can be set commensurately lower.”). 
 91.  See Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L 12) (EC) [hereinafter Brussels 
Regulation]. Also known as the Brussels Regulation, it replaced the European or Brussels Convention 
on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, entered into in 1968 
by the original Common Market member states. In the interim, the Lugano Convention “extended the 
Brussels Convention scheme to [European Free Trade Association] countries.” Kevin M. Clermont & 
John R.B. Palmer, Exorbitant Jurisdiction, 58 ME. L. REV. 474, 491 n.82 (2006); see also Convention 
on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1988  O.J (C 189) 88 
(EC) [hereinafter E.C. Convention on Jurisdiction]. 
 92.  Priest, supra note 90, at 147 (“U.S. manufacturers must design their products to comply with 
U.S. products liability standards reflecting U.S. judgments. This means that, to the extent that greater 
than compensatory damages—like punitive damages—are awarded, U.S. manufacturers must invest in 
safety at levels greater than optimal for consumers. In addition, given expanded standards of liability, 
U.S. manufacturers must insure consumers and pass the proportionate insurance premium along in the 
product price.”); see also Clarance E. Hagglund & Herbert A. Igbanugo, Are U.S. Product Liability 
Laws Acting as a Trade Barrier to the Detriment of U.S. Companies?, 42 FED. INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 
347 (1992); Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Kathleen L. Blaner, The Anti-Competitive Impact of U.S. Product 
Liability Laws: Are Foreign Businesses Beating Us at Our Own Game?, 9 J.L. & COM. 167 (1989); 
Randolph J. Stayin, The U.S. Product Liability System: A Competitive Advantage to Foreign 
Manufacturers, 14 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 193 (1988). 
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laws, the prerequisites to enforcing a foreign judgment are remarkably 
consistent across the several states and generally not onerous. 
The foreign judgment holder typically bears the burden to prove very 
little.93  As a preliminary matter, an American court generally will not 
review the merits of the underlying litigation.94  The foreign judgment 
holder need only prove that the judgment is final in the course of a court 
proceeding, either as a new lawsuit or by way of counterclaim, cross-claim, 
or defense.95  The party resisting enforcement bears the burden to establish 
one of a number of available defenses, which fall into a few generally 
recognized categories.  An American court will not enforce a judgment 
from a judicial system that lacks impartial tribunals or due process.96  An 
American court will also not enforce a judgment if the issuing court did not 
have jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject matter of the 
action.97  Nor will an American court enforce a judgment procured by 
fraud, or a judgment that is contrary to public policy.98  One important 
element is missing from American judgment recognition and enforcement 
practice: reciprocity. 
In Hilton v. Guyot, the seminal case addressing enforcement of foreign 
judgments, the Supreme Court “provide[d] the foundation for all 
subsequent common law and statutory formulas for the recognition of 
foreign judgments.”99  The Supreme Court held that, as a matter of comity, 
foreign judgments should be enforced where the foreign court system is fair 
and impartial, and the proceedings were regular and based on a proper 
assertion of jurisdiction.100  Importantly, however, the Court recognized 
one more requirement founded upon generally accepted international law: 
the foreign court must also be willing to enforce similar American 
judgments before an American court would enforce a foreign judgment.101  
Because the Court doubted that French courts would enforce an American 
judgment, the French judgment at issue in Hilton was not enforceable.102 
Over time, judgment enforcement migrated from federal law to state 
law, making a uniform state law desirable.  In 1962, the National 
 
 93.  See Brand, Recognition and Enforcement, supra note 7, at 6, 8. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. app. C, at 37–38. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202–03 (1895). 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 210–28. 
 102.  Id. at 202–03. 
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Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved and 
recommended the enactment of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments 
Recognition Act (Uniform Act).103  At the time, there were many instances 
in which foreign courts refused to recognize judgments rendered in the 
United States because of concern for lack of reciprocity—that is, the 
foreign courts doubted that American courts would recognize their 
judgments.104  As of today, thirty-two states have adopted the Uniform Act, 
and most states have not required reciprocity.105 
American courts generally do not ask whether the foreign court that 
rendered the judgment would enforce a similar judgment if it were rendered 
in the United States.106  Only eight states consider reciprocity at all, and 
only two of those states make reciprocity mandatory.107  Thus, courts in the 
United States will often enforce a foreign judgment even if the foreign 
court that rendered the judgment would not enforce an American 
judgment.108  Although most U.S. jurisdictions have abandoned reciprocity 
as a requirement, many foreign countries still require reciprocity before 
they will enforce American money judgments.109 
B. Foreign courts are generally less receptive to enforcing American 
money judgments. 
Empirical studies demonstrating that American money judgments 
receive less favorable treatment in foreign courts than foreign judgments 
receive in American courts do not currently exist.  Indeed, sound empirical 
studies may be practically impossible.110  Nevertheless, most commentators 
 
 103.  UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 104.  See, e.g., Brian Richard Paige, Foreign Judgments in American and English Courts: A 
Comparative Analysis, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 591, 598 (2003). 
 105.  Foreign Country Money Judgments Recognition Act Summary, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Foreign-Country+Money+Judgments+ 
Recognition+Act (last visited Jan. 13, 2015). 
 106.  Brand, Recognition and Enforcement, supra note 7, at 11. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  See, e.g., Matthew H. Adler, If We Build It, Will They Come?—The Need for A Multinational 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Monetary Judgments, 26 LAW & POL’Y INT’L 
BUS. 79, 94 n.86 (1994) (collecting cases enforcing foreign judgments from around the country). 
 109.  See Brand, Recognition and Enforcement, supra note 7, at 2–3 (“Other countries require proof 
of reciprocity before recognizing a foreign judgment.”); see also Samuel P. Baumgartner, How Well Do 
U.S. Judgments Fare in Europe?, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 173, 191 (2008) (“[R]eciprocity . . . [is 
a] further requirement[] in some, but not all, European countries.”); Brand, Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments, supra note 14, at 255 (“In the international arena, enforcement of United States judgments 
overseas is often possible only if the United States court rendering the judgment would enforce a 
similar decision of the foreign enforcing court.”). 
 110. See, e.g., Yaad Rotem, Economic Regulation and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality-
A New Justification, 3 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 229, 263 (2012) (“[J]urisdictions are not interested in 
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agree that American courts are much more receptive to foreign judgments 
than foreign courts are to American judgments.111  Although not an 
empirical study, the Committee on Foreign and Comparative Law of the 
New York City Bar Association conducted a “comprehensive survey” 
demonstrating the disparate treatment of U.S. money judgments abroad.112  
 
monitoring cooperation in the private ordering context because the necessary information is complex, 
and obtaining this information incurs considerable costs.”); Baumgartner, supra note 109, at 198–99 
(“Reliable data on the way the various recognition requirements are actually applied to U.S. judgments 
in practice are difficult to find. First, most European jurisdictions do not compile information at a level 
that is sufficiently detailed to pinpoint recognition matters, let alone recognition matters involving U.S. 
litigants. Thus, researchers interested in such data would have to produce them first by combing through 
large numbers of judicial records. In most countries, this would have to be done at several levels of 
government . . . [and] [t]here may be a significant number of judgment creditors who do not bother to 
bring certain recognition claims or judgment debtors who choose to pay up rather than to risk a court 
battle . . . . Engaging in this line of research requires a significant amount of time and money.  In the 
meantime, we are forced to look at the second best source of information: published decisions.”); 
Anyuan Yuan, supra note 8, at 758 (“The enforcement of foreign judgments in China has been 
notoriously difficult in recent years. Due to a lack of transparency and no case reporting system in 
China, there has not been an empirical study quantifying this difficulty.”). 
 111.  Brand, Recognition and Enforcement, supra note 7, at 2 (“Other countries tend not to be as 
liberal as the United States in recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments.”); Baumgartner, supra note 
109, at 173 (“[O]n average, U.S. judgments face more obstacles in Europe than do European judgments 
in the United States.”); Peter D. Trooboff, Ten (and Probably More) Difficulties in Negotiating a 
Worldwide Convention on International Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments: Some Initial 
Lessons, in A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 263, 264 
(John J. Barceló, III & Kevin M. Clermont eds., 2002) (“So it is a world in which we have, if you will, 
opened the door to judgments of foreign courts but where many of those same courts have not 
reciprocated by enforcing our judgments.”); Negotiation of Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement of Judgments, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 418, 419 (2001) (“Thus, while U.S. courts are perceived 
as the most open in the world to the recognition and enforcement of foreign civil judgments in the 
absence of a treaty obligation to do so, the ability of U.S. judgment holders to enforce their judgments 
abroad is much more problematic. Even in those countries that will, in principle, enforce foreign 
judgments in the absence of a treaty, the reach of U.S. long-arm jurisdiction, what they perceive to be 
‘excessive’ jury awards, and punitive damages are sometimes considered reasons not to enforce U.S. 
judgments.”) (quoting Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Prepared 
Statement for Hearing Before the Sub-comm. On Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. 
On the Judiciary, 106th Cong., at 4–9 (July 29, 2000) (on file at GWU)); Russell J. Weintraub, How 
Substantial Is Our Need For a Judgments-Recognition Convention And What Should We Bargain Away 
to Get It?, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 167, 170–71 (1998) (acknowledging that empirical proof is lacking 
while stating the conventional wisdom that foreign courts do not accord reciprocal treatment to U.S. 
judgments); Patrick J. Borchers, A Few Little Issues for the Hague Judgments Negotiations, 24 BROOK. 
J. INT’L L. 157, 157–158 (1998) (“By international standards, United States recognition of foreign 
judgments is extremely liberal. . . .  By contrast, it is much more difficult to obtain recognition of a U.S. 
judgment in most foreign nations.”); Adler, supra note 108, at 81 (stating that “the consensus” in 
academic circles and in the U.S. Department of State “is that individuals seeking enforcement of U.S. 
judgments abroad have not had the same good fortune as foreign litigants seeking enforcement in the 
United States”); Friedrich K. Juenger, The Recognition of Money Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 4 (1988) (calling treatment of U.S. judgments abroad “far from 
satisfactory”). 
 112.  Survey on Foreign Recognition, supra note 8; Katherine R. Miller, Playground Politics: 
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The Committee found that although the differences between U.S. law and 
foreign laws of judgment recognition seemed facially similar, in practice, 
foreign laws “constitute significant obstacles to the efficient recognition of 
foreign judgments.”113 
The survey described a number of reasons that domestic money 
judgments are generally more difficult to enforce abroad.114 The Committee 
surveyed practitioners in Belgium, Canada, the People’s Republic of China, 
England, Wales, France, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, 
Spain, and Switzerland about the procedure for enforcing foreign 
judgments in their courts.115  The results of the survey paint a bleak picture 
for enforcing money judgments in the subject countries.  Although the 
specific reasons were manifold, some of the most serious obstacles to 
recognition (let alone enforcement) of a domestic money judgment 
included: (1) differences in the concept of personal jurisdiction, (2) 
judgments that contravene the public policy of the foreign forum, and (3) 
practical obstacles, such as the delay and expense in utilizing foreign court 
procedures.116 
Many countries consider our concept of personal jurisdiction overly 
broad and will not enforce judgments unless the American court had 
personal jurisdiction in accordance with the law of the country where 
enforcement is sought.117  For example, Swiss law has a much narrower 
view of personal jurisdiction, basically requiring that the Swiss national be 
domiciled in the forum or have unquestionably submitted to the court’s 
jurisdiction.118  Similarly, French law grants France “exclusive” jurisdiction 
in almost all cases involving a French national, and a French court will 
 
Assessing the Wisdom of Writing A Reciprocity Requirement into U.S. International Recognition and 
Enforcement Law, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 239, 256 n.84 (2004). 
 113.  Survey on Foreign Recognition, supra note 8, at 381 (“What we found was that the relevant 
substantive and procedural laws themselves, or more precisely the variances found in them between the 
United States and the states surveyed, constitute significant hurdles to efficient recognition. While at 
first glance many of the differences may appear minimal, in the actual reality of daily practice they 
constitute significant obstacles to the efficient recognition of foreign judgments. These substantive and 
procedural differences result both from historical and cultural factors and from conscious domestic 
policy choices, and while their existence is understandable, their impact on international commercial 
activity is indisputable.”). 
 114.  Id. at 381–409 (describing differences in the concept of personal jurisdiction, judgments that 
contravene the public policy of the foreign forum, and the delay and expense in utilizing foreign court 
procedures as examples of why judgments are difficult to enforce abroad). 
 115.  Id. at 381. 
 116.  Id. at 384, 389, 409. 
 117.  Id. at 384 (“Most of the states surveyed have concepts of jurisdiction which are inconsistent 
or incompatible with U.S. concepts of long-arm jurisdiction and are not prepared to see such U.S. 
concepts expanded into their countries.”). 
 118.  Id. at 385–86. 
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refuse to enforce a foreign money judgment if it determines it has exclusive 
jurisdiction.119 
The Swiss lawyer Samuel Baumgartner in his book on the Hague 
Judgments Convention came to the same conclusion about personal 
jurisdiction as an impediment to enforcing American money judgments: 
Thus, the primary point of discussion that has arisen is based on 
European and other municipal approaches to the recognition of 
foreign adjudications that, in a tradition dating back to an epoch of 
pronounced nationalism, still significantly impede recognition if 
they do not refuse it altogether.  For example, Article 15 of the 
French Code Civil still allows a French national to resist the 
recognition of any foreign adjudication against him; Swiss law, with 
a few exceptions, generally prevents the recognition of a foreign 
judgment in personam against a defendant domiciled in 
Switzerland; and the Nordic countries still generally refuse to 
accord foreign adjudications any effect absent a treaty obligation to 
the contrary.120 
England, Wales, South Africa, Italy, Spain, and Mexico also have 
similarly restrictive concepts of personal jurisdiction that may preclude 
enforcement.121  Commentators familiar with China have also concluded 
that Chinese concepts of personal jurisdiction are more restricted than the 
“exorbitant” reach of the American minimum contacts test.122 
The enforcing court’s public policy is also a likely objection to 
recognition and enforcement of American money judgments.  Some 
countries give courts wide discretion in determining whether a judgment 
violates vague notions of justice, morality, liberty, or public order, making 
enforcement a shot in the dark.123  More specifically, every jurisdiction 
surveyed would likely refuse to enforce a judgment containing punitive, 
exemplary, or other multiple damages as contrary to their public policy.124  
Finally, the time and expense involved in actually enforcing a judgment 
abroad is often a significant handicap. In many countries, including 
Canada, South Africa, Spain, Japan, Belgium, Italy, and Mexico, 
enforcement actions likely take two years and sometimes as long as nine 
years to complete.125  These are only some of the obstacles to enforcement 
that the survey found. 
 
 119.  Id. at 386. 
 120.  BAUMGARTNER, supra note 8, at 184–85. 
 121.  Survey on Foreign Recognition, supra note 8, at 385–86. 
 122.  See, e.g., Anyuan Yuan, supra note 8, at 759. 
 123.  See Survey on Foreign Recognition, supra note 8, at 381. 
 124.  See id.; Anyuan Yuan, supra note 8, at 759. 
 125.  Survey on Foreign Recognition, supra note 8, at 409–10. 
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III. THE FAILED HAGUE JUDGMENTS CONVENTION COULD 
HAVE REDUCED THE ASYMMETRIES IN PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT 
In 1992, the United States initiated negotiations for the Hague 
Judgments Convention,126 and in the late 1990s, the U.S. participated in 
lengthy and intense negotiations, resulting in a draft convention.127  Despite 
its name, the Convention was drafted to address not only judgment 
enforcement, but also judicial (or personal) jurisdiction.128  The most 
controversial global question was whether the Convention would 
exhaustively list the permissible bases of jurisdiction, or whether it would 
create three categories of jurisdiction: a white list (required), a black list 
(prohibited), and a gray list (permitted).129  The white list would be 
composed of jurisdictional bases that, if used, would entitle the judgment 
creditor to enforce the judgment in a member state.130  The black list would 
be composed of jurisdictional bases that were prohibited but, if exercised 
nonetheless, would bar a judgment creditor from enforcing the judgment in 
the other member states.131 The gray list would be composed of 
jurisdictional bases that, if used, may or may not entitle the judgment 
creditor to enforce it abroad, depending upon the domestic law of the state 
where enforcement is sought.132 
Somewhat surprisingly, there was very little difference among the 
Hague Conference members on the mechanics of how to enforce 
judgments.133  Essentially, Convention states would be required to enforce 
judgments where jurisdiction was premised on a “white list” basis, and to 
deny enforcement of judgments where jurisdiction was premised on a 
“black list” basis.134  The Convention also provided generally accepted 
 
 126.  Baumgartner, supra note 109, at 175–76 (“[T]he United States initiated negotiations for a 
global convention on the recognition of foreign judgments at The Hague in 1992, hoping that the new 
treaty would significantly improve the recognition of U.S. judgments in the rest of the world.”); Gralf-
Peter Calliess, Value-Added Norms, Local Litigation, and Global Enforcement: Why the Brussels-
Philosophy Failed in the Hague, 5 GERMAN L.J. 1489, 1489 (2004) (“In the early Nineties the Hague 
Conference on International Private Law on initiative of the United States started negotiations on a 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters.”). 
 127.  BAUMGARTNER, supra note 8, at 4. 
 128.  Id. at 3–4. 
 129.  Id. at 2–3. 
 130.  Id. at 3. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. at 181. 
 134.  Linda J. Silberman, Can the Hague Judgments Project be Saved?: A Perspective from the 
United States, in A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 159, 
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discretionary defenses to recognition and enforcement, such as the 
enforcing state’s public policy.135  Jurisdiction, however, was a much more 
contentious topic, resulting in the most immediate obstacle to any progress 
on the Convention. 
A. The United States and the European Nations are at an impasse. 
The primary goal of the United States has always been to “improve 
the recognition of U.S. judgments in Europe and elsewhere, while that of 
continental Europeans (and others) has been to circumscribe the judicial 
jurisdiction of American courts.”136  In the very earliest meetings, our 
European Hague Conference negotiating partners complained about “U.S. 
courts assuming general jurisdiction over cases involving non-U.S. litigants 
and the problems such assumptions of jurisdiction presented for non-U.S. 
parties.”137  The American delegation, however, 
[C]hallenged our colleagues to furnish us with examples of such 
cases but received not a single report of such a case . . . . We 
recognize that many non-U.S. parties object to having to litigate in 
the United States, but the issue is whether general jurisdiction is the 
problem.  We see little evidence that it is.138 
There is a common misconception that notions of personal jurisdiction 
are much broader in the U.S. than they are in Europe; indeed, American 
and European bases of personal jurisdiction overlap considerably.139  The 
European countries’ real objection seems to be the conduct of American 
litigation, with its wide-ranging discovery and the prospect of large 
 
180 (John J. Barceló, III & Kevin M. Clermont eds., 2002); see also Friedrich K. Juenger, A Hague 
Judgments Convention?, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 111, 118-19 (1998) (describing a mixed convention 
such as the Hague Judgments Convention as containing “white,” “black,” and “gray” bases for 
exercising jurisdiction). 
 135.  Id. at 180 n.122. 
 136.  BAUMGARTNER, supra note 8, at 185–86; see also Linda J. Silberman & Andreas F. 
Lowenfeld, A Different Challenge for the ALI: Herein of Foreign Country Judgments, an International 
Treaty, and an American Statute, 75 IND. L.J. 635, 639 (2000) (“For other countries, whose judgments 
are already enforced here in the absence of a treaty and without any requirement of reciprocity, the 
primary interest in a convention is in establishing a narrower scope of jurisdictional authority over their 
domiciliaries.”). 
 137.   Trooboff, supra note 111, at 273. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  See Silberman & Lowenfeld, supra note 136, at 639 n.22 (“It is a common but incorrect 
assumption that judicial jurisdiction of United States courts is more expansive than that of other 
countries. The United States and many European countries have remarkably similar jurisdictional bases 
in many situations, and often the jurisdictional reach of foreign courts is broader than that of United 
States courts, particularly in multiparty cases where jurisdiction over one defendant establishes 
jurisdiction over other defendants.”) (citation omitted). 
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damages.140  As one non-governmental member of the American delegation 
noted: 
[T]o be frank, United States judgments are feared in the rest of the 
world.  There is genuine concern over the assertion of jurisdiction 
by United States courts because of the size of the awards that juries 
in the United States are believed to grant in civil litigation.  
Empirical evidence to the contrary, newspaper publicity about 
multimillion dollar judgments for injuries suffered from an overly 
hot cup of coffee is not readily overcome.  Further, there is a 
perception that United States courts assert jurisdiction in 
circumstances that courts of other nations would not.  As a result, 
when other countries in the Hague Conference and certainly 
European countries, came to the table to start this exercise, they had 
a single, clear objective in mind, which was to limit and restrict to 
the maximum extent possible, the jurisdiction that the United States 
courts assert.141 
During Convention negotiations, the U.S. interest in judgment 
enforceability and the European interest in limiting the jurisdiction of U.S. 
courts were “pitted” against each other, and “so overpowered the 
discussions that delegates from other countries had difficulty bringing to 
bear their own insights and concerns.”142  Unfortunately, by the year 2000, 
the United States and the European Union had arrived at an impasse. 
In 2000, at the request of the U.S. State Department, negotiations were 
postponed.143  Although many issues remain unresolved, many of the most 
controversial issues from the American perspective have to do with 
European attempts to limit American personal jurisdiction.144  For example, 
would general in personam or “doing business” jurisdiction be on the black 
list or the gray list?145  Could we come to an agreement on specific bases of 
jurisdiction for contracts, and would they favor consumers and employers 
at the expense of businesses and employers?146  The American delegation, 
for its part, seemed prepared to negotiate away perhaps the most obvious 
example of jurisdictional overreaching in the United States: “tag” 
jurisdiction established by personal service in the forum state.147  The 
 
 140.  Trooboff, supra note 134, at 267. 
 141.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 142.  BAUMGARTNER, supra note 8, at 4–5. 
 143.  Id. at 5. 
 144.  Id. at 4–6. 
 145.  Id. at 6. 
 146.  Trooboff, supra note 111, at 270. 
 147.  Id. at 285; see also Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (“[J]urisdiction 
based on physical presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing traditions 
of our legal system that define the due process standard of “traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.”). 
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American delegation even seemed willing to compromise on “excessive” 
damages.148  The Europeans, however, had little incentive to compromise in 
their efforts to circumscribe what they perceived to be exorbitant American 
jurisdiction.149  As the State Department’s advisor testified to Congress, 
“[s]ince litigants from most developed countries have no substantial 
difficulties enforcing judgments in the United States, their governments 
believe they have substantial negotiating leverage over us.”150  Other 
nongovernmental members of the American delegation agree that the 
difference between how the United States and other countries treat foreign 
judgments “puts the United States in a weaker bargaining position when we 
sit at the negotiating table at the Hague Conference.”151  Certainly many 
more obstacles—some of them very problematic—remain. For example, 
will the Convention address antitrust judgments?  What about intellectual 
property?  And what about the thorny issue of jurisdiction over e-
commerce businesses?  For now, however, the United States and Europe 
remain at loggerheads, and without a change in dynamics, these and other 
important issues will remain unresolved, and the Hague Judgments 
Convention will fade into history as nothing more than an interesting 
academic exercise. 
B. The Convention would have benefitted U.S. consumers by making 
the place of injury a valid basis for personal jurisdiction. 
One of the principal benefits to U.S. consumers injured by a foreign 
manufacturer’s products would have been the Convention’s personal 
jurisdiction provision.152  The Convention would have allowed a plaintiff to 
bring suit in the state where the injury originated.153 The Convention 
essentially incorporated the rule as it exists in the European Union, which 
grants personal jurisdiction over the parties to the court of the forum where 
 
 148.  Arthur T. von Mehren, Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of 
Foreign Judgments Acceptable Worldwide: Can the Hague Conference Project Succeed?, in A GLOBAL 
LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 281, 284–285 (John J. Barceló, III 
& Kevin M. Clermont eds., 2002). 
 149.  Negotiation of Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments, supra note 111, at 
419–20. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Trooboff, supra note 111, at 264. 
 152.  Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 9, art. 10(1) (“A plaintiff may bring an action in 
tort or delict in the courts of the State . . . in which the injury arose . . . .”). 
 153.  See George L. Droz, Preliminary Draft of the Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters: Provisions on Jurisdiction, in A GLOBAL LAW OF 
JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 15, 23 (John J. Barceló, III & Kevin M. 
Clermont eds., 2002) (citing Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 9, art. 10(1)). 
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the injury occurred.154  European Union regulations provide for the exercise 
of specific jurisdiction “in matters relating to tort . . . in the courts for the 
place where the harmful event occurred.”155  The Court of Justice of the 
European Communities has interpreted “where the harmful event occurred” 
as including both “the place where the damages occurred or . . . the place of 
the event which gives rise to and is at the origin of that damage.”156  As a 
result, the Convention would have granted courts in the United States 
personal jurisdiction over defendants on the basis that the injury occurred 
in the forum jurisdiction.  However, this rule would conflict with Supreme 
Court rulings that the mere occurrence of an injury in the forum is not 
sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant.157 
C. The Hague Judgment Convention’s personal jurisdiction provision 
as drafted, however, would have been unconstitutional. 
Even if the United States had ratified the Hague Convention, 
American courts likely would have found its treatment of personal 
jurisdiction to be unconstitutional. The precise relationship between treaties 
and the Constitution is not perfectly clear in the United States.  Although 
the Constitution includes a Supremacy Clause establishing that treaties 
prevail in any conflict with state law, the Supremacy Clause does not 
resolve conflicts between treaties and other domestic law, including 
specifically the Constitution.  Reasonable minds can disagree as to whether 
treaties can, under some circumstances, expand the power of an otherwise 
limited federal government—even in the specific context of a potential 
conflict between Supreme Court personal jurisdiction doctrine and the 
Hague Judgments Convention.158  The Supreme Court’s resolution of Reid 
 
 154.  Brussels Regulation, supra note 91, art. 4 at 16; see also E.C. Convention on Jurisdiction, 
supra note 91, at 98. 
 155. Brussels Regulation, supra note 91, art. 5(2); see also E.C. Convention on Jurisdiction, supra 
note 91, at 98. 
 156.  Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 531, 550 (1995); see also Case 21/76, Handelskwekerij G.J. Bier B.V. v. Mines de Potasse 
d’Alsace S.A., 1976 E.C.R. 1735, 1748 (holding that created the doctrine of “alternative jurisdiction,” 
permitting the plaintiff to sue either where the act or omission occurred or where the injury originated). 
 157.  See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295–97 (1980) (collecting 
cases and explaining how the occurrence of an injury in a location is not sufficient to establish personal 
jurisdiction); see also, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) 
(“[F]oreseeability of causing injury in another State . . . is not a sufficient benchmark for exercising 
personal jurisdiction.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 158. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (holding that a treaty was constitutional 
although similar congressional legislation had been held unconstitutional); see also Dames & Moore v. 
Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (holding that executive agreements touching on foreign relations can, even 
in the absence of any explicit Congressional approval—whether by consent of the Senate or 
Congressional legislation—can survive constitutional scrutiny); Patrick J. Borchers, Judgments 
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v. Covert, however, creates a significant risk that the Supreme Court will 
refuse to apply the treaty’s personal jurisdiction provision.159 
In Reid v. Covert, the wife of an American serviceman killed her 
husband while they were living on an American military base in Britain.160  
The United States Military tried her in a military tribunal pursuant to the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, which did not provide for a jury trial.161  
The wife challenged her conviction, arguing that she was entitled to a jury 
trial under Article III, section 2, and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the 
U.S. Constitution.162  The United States claimed that the treaty between the 
U.S. and Great Britain granted military courts jurisdiction over servicemen 
and their dependents when they commit crimes in Great Britain; therefore, 
the treaty justified a military trial of a civilian, without a jury.163  The 
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the treaty conflicted with specific 
rights granted by the Constitution, which must prevail.164  As a result, the 
treaty could not impair the defendant’s constitutional rights.165 
The Supreme Court seems likely to come to a similar result in the 
event of a conflict between the Hague Judgments Convention and the Due 
Process Clause. The Court has long held that personal jurisdiction is a 
personal due process right, premised on the due process clauses of either 
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.166  As described above, the Court has 
also repeatedly held that the mere occurrence of an injury in the forum is 
not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant.167  The 
Hague Judgments Convention as drafted, however, does just that; it makes 
the occurrence of an injury in the forum a valid basis for exercising 
 
Conventions and Minimum Contacts, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1161, 1173–74 (1998) (“It is, of course, not my 
contention that any provision in any treaty or convention will automatically withstand constitutional 
challenge.  But it gives far too little weight to the special nature of foreign affairs to assume that some 
modest adjustments to our jurisdictional regime will provoke the Supreme Court’s ire, and cause it—for 
the first time in history—to strike down a treaty provision as unconstitutional.”). 
 159. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); cf. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933) 
(holding that subsequent treaty should be given effect over prior, inconsistent federal statute). 
 160. Reid, 354 U.S. at 3. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 5. 
 163. Id. 
 164.  Id. at 6. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). 
 167.  See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295–97 (1980) (collecting 
cases and explaining how the occurrence of an injury in a location is not sufficient to establish personal 
jurisdiction); see also, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) 
(“[F]oreseeability of causing injury in another State . . . is not a sufficient benchmark for exercising 
personal jurisdiction.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
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jurisdiction over the defendant in that forum.  In cases where a foreign 
manufacturer’s product injures an American and no other “contact” 
apparently exists, the defendant can credibly argue that the Constitution 
trumps the treaty. 
D. The United States should amend the Convention to incorporate the 
concept of consent. 
Consent has always been a valid basis for establishing personal 
jurisdiction.168  Personal jurisdiction is a “personal” defense—a defendant 
has an individual right to contest the forum court’s personal jurisdiction, 
and the defendant may always waive that right.169  Although personal 
jurisdiction is a “personal” defense, a sovereign has the authority to subject 
its own citizens to a foreign court’s jurisdiction.170  Extradition treaties are 
one obvious example.  The United States has extradition treaties with over 
100 countries,171 many of which explicitly permit the United States to 
extradite its own citizens to face charges in foreign courts.172  In fact, under 
United States law, the Secretary of State may extradite a U.S. citizen to a 
foreign country even where the specific extradition treaty with that foreign 
sovereign exempts U.S. citizens from extradition.173  And the Supreme 
Court has held that no principle of international law prohibits a sovereign 
 
 168.  See, e.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473 (forum selection clause); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (forum selection clause). 
 169.  Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702–03 
(1982) (“The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty 
interest . . . . Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an individual right, 
it can, like other such rights, be waived.”). 
 170.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3196 (1990) (authorizing extradition of U.S. citizens); Dames & Moore 
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 665 (1981) (affirming executive agreement that subjected U.S. citizens to 
special civil claims process in dispute with Iran). 
 171.  18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1996). The list of treaties appended to § 3181 can be found at 18 U.S.C. § 
3181–Notes, CORNELL LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/ 
3181 (last visited Mar. 11, 2015). 
 172.  See, e.g., Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1104 (5th Cir. 1980) (United States-
Mexico Extradition Treaty); Peroff v. Hylton, 563 F.2d 1099, 1102 (4th Cir. 1977) (United States-
Sweden Extradition Treaty). 
 173.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3196 (“If the applicable treaty or convention does not obligate the United 
States to extradite its citizens to a foreign country, the Secretary of State may, nevertheless, order the 
surrender to that country of a United States citizen whose extradition has been requested by that country 
if the other requirements of that treaty or convention are met.”). The executive, however, does not have 
unbridled authority to extradite U.S. citizens; rather, some statute or treaty must authorize extradition.  
See Valentine v. U.S. ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 9 (1936) (“There is no executive discretion to 
surrender him to a foreign government, unless that discretion is granted by law. It necessarily follows 
that as the legal authority does not exist save as it is given by act of Congress or by the terms of a treaty, 
it is not enough that statute or treaty does not deny the power to surrender. It must be found that statute 
or treaty confers the power.”). 
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from extraditing its citizens and subjecting them to a foreign courts’ 
jurisdiction.174 
Sovereigns may also agree to subject their citizens to the jurisdiction 
of international tribunals. For example, the Supreme Court upheld an 
executive order doing just that in Dames & Moore v. Regan.175  In early 
1981, the President issued executive orders implementing an agreement 
with Iran that resolved the Iranian Hostage Crisis.176 The President 
suspended all claims between American and Iranian nationals or their 
respective governments and referred such claims to binding arbitration at 
the newly created Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.177  In holding that 
such orders were constitutional, the Supreme Court discussed how “the 
United States has repeatedly exercised its sovereign authority to settle the 
claims of its nationals against foreign countries . . . . in return for lump-sum 
payments or the establishment of arbitration procedures.”178  Similarly, the 
International Criminal Court exercises jurisdiction over individuals, 
including citizens and non-citizens alike, who commit genocide, crimes 
against humanity, or war crimes within a signatory state.179  Both U.S. 
domestic law and international law apparently recognize a sovereign’s 
authority to subject its own nationals to the jurisdiction of a foreign court or 
tribunal. Under the circumstances currently described in the Hague 
Judgments Convention, neither the United States nor its Hague Conference 
negotiating partners should have any difficulty with treaty language stating 
that the signatory countries “consent” to jurisdiction in the courts of other 
signatory countries. 
 
 
 174.  Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 467 (1913) (“The conclusion we reach is, that there is no 
principle of international law by which citizens are excepted out of an agreement to surrender ‘persons,’ 
where no such exception is made in the treaty itself.”). 
 175.  Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 665. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. at 679. 
 179.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; see 
also Jurisdiction and Admissibility, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about 
%20the%20court/icc%20at%20a%20glance/Pages/jurisdiction%20and%20admissibility.aspx 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2015). 
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IV. DOMESTIC LAW CAN ALLEVIATE THESE JURISDICTIONAL 
AND ENFORCEMENT DISPARITIES AND CREATE INCENTIVES 
FOR OUR NEGOTIATING PARTNERS TO AGREE TO A REVISED 
HAGUE JUDGMENTS CONVENTION 
A. The Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act can establish 
personal jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers. 
In response to well-publicized foreign defective products like toxic 
drywall and children’s toys contaminated with lead, members of Congress 
from both sides of the aisle have proposed legislation designed to establish 
personal jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers whose products are sold in 
the United States.  This bipartisan legislation is known as the Foreign 
Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act (FMLAA), and would require the 
manufacturer of a covered product to register an agent for service of 
process in one state, who is authorized to accept service of process.180  The 
FMLAA also provides that, by registering an agent, the foreign 
manufacturer consents to personal jurisdiction in the courts of the state in 
which the manufacturer maintains the registered agent. 
Both an international trade group and a think tank have criticized the 
FMLAA on several grounds, none of which is a persuasive reason for 
rejecting the FMLAA. One trade group claims that the “cost of maintaining 
such a registered agent would be significant, especially for some of the 
smaller exporters.”181 Such an objection may stem from a lack of 
information about the availability of outsourcing.  Foreign manufacturers 
would not actually have to rent an office in the United States and hire full-
time lawyers to staff that office.  Many companies in the United States 
already provide very inexpensive, convenient, and efficient registered agent 
services for companies, both foreign and domestic, needing to establish a 
resident agent who can accept service of process.182  Because the providers 
serve as agents for numerous companies, these services are very 
inexpensive.  Registered agent service providers charge less than $200 per 
 
 180.  See FMLAA, supra note 10. 
 181.  Pritam Banerjee, The Foreign Manufacturers Liability and Accountability Act: a major 
concern for Indian exporters to the US, WORLD COM. REV. 1 (Sept. 2010), http://www.worldcommerce 
review.com/publications/article_pdf/294. 
 182.  See, e.g., LEGAL ZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/additional-business-services/registered-
agent-services.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2015) (offering registered agent services for $159 per year); 
INCORP, http://www.incorp.com/registered-agent-resident-agent-services.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 
2015) (offering registered agent services for $99 a year); REGISTERED AGENTS, http://www.registered 
agents.com/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2015) (offering registered agent services for $59 per year or as low as 
$40 per year for multi-year orders). 
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year for such services and some companies charge less than $50 per year.183  
One hundred dollars per year is hardly a significant cost, even for the 
smallest exporters.  These services are also efficient—they can scan and 
deliver any papers served on the agent to the foreign company 
electronically and almost instantly.  Even the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO), which evaluated the cost to foreign companies of complying with 
the original version of the FMLAA using industry-provided information, 
concluded the cost would not be significant.184  Moreover, as described 
below, the FMLAA can and should be revised to eliminate any need to 
actually register and maintain an agent. 
The international trade group also objects to the FMLAA on the 
grounds that it imposes significant costs on importers, which would raise 
the prices of imported goods and harm the economy.185  These claims are 
not supported by actual cost estimates and may be overstated.186  In its 
scoring of the original version of the FMLAA, the CBO concluded that the 
cost to private companies to comply with the substantive portions of the 
FMLAA “would probably exceed” the reporting threshold under the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, which was approximately $141 million in 
2010.187  Taking the CBO’s estimate, and assuming that manufacturers 
would simply pass along the cost to consumers, spreading $141 million per 
year of compliance costs across foreign imported goods, which totaled 
more than $2.5 trillion last year, would impact consumers by adding 
approximately 0.006% to the price.188  This is roughly equivalent to half a 
cent for a $100 good, or roughly $1 for a $20,000 good.  Certainly the cost 
could exceed the CBO’s estimate of $141 million, and the burdens would 
not fall equally on all imported goods.  But the miniscule nature of the 
burden in proportion to the enormous volume and value of foreign trade 
suggests that the burden would not be significant. 
The CATO Institute (CATO) also criticizes the FMLAA as an 
 
 183. LEGAL ZOOM, supra note 182; INCORP, supra note 182; REGISTERED AGENTS, supra note 
182. 
 184.  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, H.R. 4678 FOREIGN MANUFACTURERS LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
ACT OF 2010, at 2 (2010) [hereinafter BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE] (“Based on information from 
industry sources about the cost of hiring or appointing registered agents and on the small incremental 
difference between current safety standards for consumer products and the legislation’s requirement, 
CBO estimates that the cost to comply with those mandates would not be significant.”). 
 185.  See Banerjee, supra note 181, at 1. 
 186.  See BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE, supra note 184, at 2. 
 187.  See id. 
 188.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU & U.S. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. INT’L TRADE IN 
GOODS AND SERVICES (Jan. 2013); see also The People’s Republic of China, OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/china (explaining that 
imports of goods from China alone in 2011 amounted to almost $400 billion). 
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impermissible trade barrier.  CATO claims that the FMLAA would violate 
Article III of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) because 
the FMLAA supposedly discriminates against foreign products by 
requiring the foreign manufacturer to register an agent, while exempting 
domestic manufacturers from this requirement.189  Such discrimination 
would supposedly violate the “national treatment” provision found in 
Article III:4 of the GATT, an important treaty administered by the World 
Trade Organization.190  National treatment, however, “only applies once a 
product, service or item of intellectual property has entered the market.”191  
Therefore, “charging customs duty on an import is not a violation of 
national treatment even if locally-produced products are not charged an 
equivalent tax.”192  Here, the FMLAA requires a foreign manufacturer to 
register an agent as a condition of having its goods imported into the 
United States.  Like a custom or duty, the FMLAA applies to the 
manufacturer before its product enters the United States market.  Thus, the 
FMLAA does not violate the “national treatment” or “nondiscrimination” 
principle as CATO suggests. 
Both critics also claim that the FMLAA’s registration requirements 
violate GATT Article XI, which prohibits any restrictions on imports, other 
than “duties, taxes, or other charges.”193  CATO acknowledges, however, 
that GATT Article XX permits WTO members like the United States to 
deviate from Article XI in order to “protect human, animal or plant life or 
health,”194 or “to secure compliance with laws or regulations.”195  CATO 
also acknowledges that “[t]he safety issues behind the bill are real enough” 
and that the FMLAA’s “principal goal is to protect American consumers 
from unsafe foreign products.”196  CATO claims, however, that the 
FMLAA is not “necessary” because the Hague Service Convention on the 
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or 
Commercial Matters (Hague Service Convention) already meets the 
 
 189.  See Daniel Griswold & Sallie James, “Consumer Safety” Bill Could Boomerang against U.S. 
Manufacturers, CATO: FREE TRADE BULL. 42, at 2 (Sept. 28, 2010), http://object.cato.org/sites/ 
cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/FTB-042.pdf. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  WORLD TRADE ORG., Principles of the trading system, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: BASICS, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2015). 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 
194 [hereinafter GATT]; see Griswold & James, supra note 189, at 3; see also Banerjee, supra note 
181. 
 194.  GATT, supra note 193, art. XX[b]. 
 195.  GATT, supra note 193, art. XX[d]. 
 196.  Griswold & James, supra note 189, at 1. 
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FMLAA’s public policy goals. CATO’s criticism stems from a 
misunderstanding of the Hague Service Convention and how the 
Convention operates in practice. 
The Convention also does not obviate the need for the FMLAA.197 
First, the Hague Service Convention, as the name suggests, deals only with 
service, not personal jurisdiction.198  Service and personal jurisdiction are 
distinct concepts. Serving a foreign manufacturer via the Hague Service 
Convention does not establish personal jurisdiction over the foreign 
manufacturer.199  Second, although the Hague Service Convention is a 
widely ratified multilateral treaty, it is not universal. Many countries are 
not signatories to the Hague Service Convention, including countries in 
South America, Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.200  Third, 
even if the Hague Service Convention could somehow establish personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer, it is an inefficient and unreliable 
mechanism that fails to actually effect service nearly one-third of the 
time.201  The FMLAA provides a more legitimate method to achieve the 
important public policy goal of protecting U.S. consumers. 
Critics further claim that the FMLAA invites retaliatory legislation 
from foreign countries, requiring American companies to subject 
themselves to personal jurisdiction in product liability lawsuits in 
underdeveloped or even corrupt judicial systems.202  This criticism is 
misplaced.  First, an underdeveloped or manifestly corrupt judicial system 
is unlikely to be located in an industrialized nation—the type of nation with 
which we would be more likely to be concerned about trade wars.  More 
importantly, however, many industrialized nations already have rules that 
would subject the American exporter to a foreign court’s personal 
jurisdiction, and thus potential liability, if the American exporter’s 
 
 197.  The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in 
Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361 [hereinafter Hague 
Service Convention]. 
 198.  See Eric Porterfield, Too Much Process, Not Enough Service: International Service of 
Process Under the Hague Service Convention, 86 TEMPLE L. REV. 331, 332 (2014) (explaining that the 
Hague Service Convention is a multilateral treaty that provides methods for accomplishing service of 
process on foreign parties). 
 199.  See Hague Service Convention, supra note 197, at art. 1 (indicating that the Convention 
applies only to civil or commercial matters that require service of judicial or extrajudicial documents). 
 200.  See Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, Status Table 14: Convention of 15 November 
1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 
THE WORLD ORG. FOR CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION IN CIV. AND COM. MATTERS (Aug. 22, 2014),  
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=17. 
 201.  Porterfield, supra note 198, at 346. 
 202.  See Letter from the National Association of Manufacturers, Organization for International 
Investment, to Senate (Dec. 12, 2011) (expressing opposition to the FMLAA). 
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defective product harms a foreign national in his home country.203  Indeed, 
the whole purpose of the FMLAA is to bring America’s overly restrictive 
concept of personal jurisdiction more in line with the rest of the world.204  
And if a foreign national attempts to enforce a judgment in the United 
States against a U.S. manufacturer where the judgment was obtained via 
fraud or a corrupt judicial system, the law already protects the U.S. 
manufacturer.205  U.S. manufacturers already run the risk of unfair 
treatment abroad—the FMLAA is designed to rectify the unfair treatment 
of these manufacturers at home. 
Finally, critics claim that the FMLAA as currently worded would be 
unconstitutional because it requires foreign manufacturers to consent to 
personal jurisdiction without regard for those foreign manufacturers’ 
contacts with the forum state.206  The Supreme Court has long recognized 
that registration statutes like the FMLAA, where a company is required to 
establish an agent who consents to personal jurisdiction as a condition of 
doing business in the forum state, are constitutional.207  Even before the 
 
 203.  Linda Silberman, Comparative Jurisdiction in the International Context: Will the Proposed 
Hague Judgments Convention Be Stalled?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 319, 322-23 (2002) (“[I]t is interesting 
to note that in many respects U.S. assertions of judicial jurisdiction are actually narrower than those in 
many civil law countries and even other common law countries. For example, civil law countries have, 
in some circumstances, asserted jurisdiction based on the nationality of the plaintiff and have provisions 
for unlimited jurisdiction based on property in their state. Jurisdictional bases such as these have been 
identified as ‘exorbitant’ under the Brussels/Lugano regimes and may not be exercised as against 
domiciliaries of those countries. Nonetheless, assertions of jurisdiction on these grounds are appropriate 
with respect to defendants from other countries, including U.S. defendants.”) (emphasis added); 
Clermont & Palmer, supra note 91, at 486 (“In short, U.S. interests are being whipsawed: not only are 
U.S. citizens still subject, in theory, to the far-reaching jurisdiction of European courts and the wide 
recognition and enforceability of the resulting European judgments, but, in practice, U.S. judgments 
tend to receive short shrift in European courts.”); see also Brussels Regulation, supra note 91, art. 4 
(explaining that the jurisdictional laws of member states still control the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over persons domiciled outside a member state). 
 204.  See FMLAA, supra note 10 (“United States laws and the laws of United States trading 
partners should not put burdens on foreign manufacturers and producers that do not apply to domestic 
companies”). 
 205.  See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895) (“[T]here has been opportunity for a full and 
fair trial abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, 
after due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely 
to secure an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and those of 
other countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under 
which it is sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment . . . .”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICTS § 98, cmt. c (1971) (citing Hilton). 
 206.  See, e.g., Griswold & James, supra note 189, at 1. 
 207.  Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404, 406 (1855); Pa. Fire Ins. Co. of Phila. v. Gold Issue 
& Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 96 (1917); see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 201 (1977) (noting 
that a foreign corporation’s consent to jurisdiction pursuant to a consent statute would have justified 
exercise of general jurisdiction). 
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Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the Court upheld a registration statute 
compelling a corporation to consent to personal jurisdiction in suits 
connected with its transactions in the state.208  Moreover, the Supreme 
Court has blessed a state statute that required an out-of-state corporation to 
consent to general jurisdiction in the courts of that state, even where the 
claim did not arise out of the corporation’s business in that state.209  At 
least as applied to the FMLAA, which would require express consent to 
jurisdiction for claims involving the manufacturer’s product in return for 
the privilege of having the manufacturer’s product sold in the United 
States, this form of consent has a long history of approval from the 
Supreme Court and is likely constitutional.210 
B. The FMLAA is flawed, however, and should be amended. 
Although the FMLAA is an admirable start, it does not go nearly far 
enough.  One of its flaws lies in requiring the foreign manufacturer to 
designate an agent in only one state.  Most significantly, this promotes a 
race to the bottom.  Because the FMLAA requires designation of an agent 
in only one state, a foreign manufacturer will rationally decide to designate 
an agent in the state that is the most favorable to the manufacturer, or the 
most unfavorable to the consumer.  A foreign manufacturer may choose to 
designate an agent in the state with the least claimant-friendly product 
liability law.  Similarly, a foreign manufacturer may choose to designate an 
agent in the state with the least claimant-friendly juries.  A foreign 
manufacturer may also choose to designate an agent in the state that is the 
most geographically inconvenient for most potential claimants, such as 
Hawaii or Alaska.  As a result, the FMLAA should be revised to require 
 
 208.  Lafayette, 59 U.S. at 407 (1855). 
 209.  Pa. Fire, 243 U.S. at 96; see also Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 201 (noting that a foreign corporation’s 
consent to jurisdiction pursuant to a consent statute would have justified exercise of general 
jurisdiction); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 444 (1952) (noting that the 
physical presence of a foreign corporation’s authorized agent would warrant the exercise of general 
jurisdiction); Smolik v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148, 150–51 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) 
(holding that a foreign corporation’s designation of an agent for service of process was valid for a wide 
range of actions); Bagdon v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 111 N.E. 1075, 1077 (N.Y. 1916) 
(finding that the voluntary appointment of an agent created personal jurisdiction). 
 210.  See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 622 (1990) (“But a doctrine of personal 
jurisdiction that dates back to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and is still generally observed 
unquestionably meets that standard.”) (Scalia, J.); see also Matthew Kipp, Inferring Express Consent: 
The Paradox of Permitting Registration Statutes to Confer General Jurisdiction, 9 REV. LITIG. 1, 34–41 
(1990) (discussing whether registration statutes can confer general personal jurisdiction and whether 
registration statutes that infer consent are constitutional after Shaffer’s statement that all assertions of 
state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and 
its progeny.) (citing Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212 (1977)). 
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foreign manufacturers, as a condition of having that manufacturer’s product 
distributed in any state of the United States, to consent to personal 
jurisdiction in any court that is an otherwise proper venue.  As a practical 
matter, this will result in personal jurisdiction in a state where a significant 
part of the events or omissions took place—namely, the injury—making 
personal jurisdiction compatible with the Brussels philosophy.211  As 
revised, the FMLAA will reduce the asymmetry in personal jurisdiction 
because foreign manufacturers will be subject to personal jurisdiction, and 
American tort law, to at least the same extent as American manufacturers. 
C. Congress should enact the ALI’s Foreign Judgments Recognition 
and Enforcement Act, incorporating a reciprocity requirement. 
The ALI’s Foreign Judgments Recognition and Enforcement Act can 
also help level the playing field and provide incentives to our Hague 
Conference negotiating partners to return to the negotiating table.212  While 
the Hague Conference on Private International Law was negotiating the 
Hague Judgments Convention, the State Department requested the 
American Law Institute to begin drafting federal legislation designed to 
implement the Hague Judgments Convention.213  Although negotiations 
stalled, the ALI decided that United States law would still benefit from a 
uniform federal approach to enforcing foreign judgments, as opposed to the 
current state-by-state approach with its patchwork quilt of applicable 
laws.214  To that end, the ALI drafted proposed federal legislation known as 
the Foreign Judgments Recognition and Enforcement Act (FJREA).215  The 
FJREA’s most controversial—and most important—departure from current 
foreign judgment recognition practice is the way it revives the concept of 
reciprocity. That is, a domestic court will not enforce a foreign judgment 
where the issuing court would not enforce a similar judgment.216 
As a preliminary matter, it seems uncontroversial to recognize that 
Congress has the authority to return foreign judgment recognition from 
 
 211.  Service can continue to be effected through an agent required to be designated in at least one 
state as originally contemplated by the FMLAA, through the Hague Service Convention or other treaty 
concerning service. See Porterfield, supra note 198. 
 212.  RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS, ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED 
FEDERAL STATUTE, at xiii (2005). 
 213.  Id.; see Silberman & Lowenfeld, supra note 136. 
 214.  RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS, supra note 212, at xiii; see 
Silberman & Lowenfeld, supra note 136. 
 215.  RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS, supra note 212, at xiii; see 
Silberman & Lowenfeld, supra note 136; see also Brand, Recognition and Enforcement, supra note 7, 
at 6, 8. 
 216.  RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS, supra note 212, at xiii–xiv. 
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state to federal control.  Congress could enact a uniform federal law for the 
enforcement of foreign judgments under its Foreign Commerce Clause 
power.217  Congress also has the authority to enact the FRJEA as touching 
upon foreign relations.218  And the FRJEA is also consistent with Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 69.219  Rule 69 need not be amended because, 
although the rule requires federal courts to follow state judgment 
enforcement procedures, Rule 69(a) already provides that any federal 
statute governs to the extent it applies.220 
The FJREA reflects a broad policy to enforce final judgments issued 
by foreign courts and, like existing state law, precludes a court from 
reviewing the underlying suit on the merits.221  Also like existing law, the 
party opposing the foreign judgment bears the burden to establish that the 
rendering court did not have jurisdiction over his person.222  The party 
resisting enforcement also similarly bears the burden to establish some 
defect with the foreign judgment in particular, or the foreign court system 
in general, such as a fraudulently obtained judgment or a corrupt court 
system.223  The key difference between the FJREA and the prevailing 
practice in the United States is found in Section 7, entitled “Reciprocal 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments”: “[a] foreign 
judgment shall not be recognized or enforced in a court in the United States 
if the court finds that comparable judgments of courts in the United States 
would not be recognized or enforced in the courts of the state of origin.”224 
 
 217.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, supra note 14, at 
257. 
 218.  Whitten, supra note 15, at 582 n.133 (“Although Congress possesses enumerated powers that 
would support such legislation [the ALI’s draft FJREA] in some of its applications, such as the foreign 
commerce power the implied power over foreign affairs might be necessary to sustain application of the 
legislation to all cases.”) (citations omitted); see also Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 1634–35 (1997) 
(“Such suits typically implicate issues that fall in the gray zone between substance and procedure: 
transnational choice of law, transnational forum non conveniens, the enforcement of transnational 
forum selection clauses, and the recognition of foreign judgments. These issues are not governed by 
enacted federal law. The question thus arises whether they are governed by state law or federal common 
law. The Supreme Court has not resolved this question. But some lower courts have ruled that these 
issues implicate federal foreign relations interests and should be governed by the federal common law 
of foreign relations. Commentators overwhelmingly agree with this conclusion.”); HENKIN, supra note 
15, at 16–22, 70–72 (discussing the unenumerated foreign affairs power of Congress). 
 219.  FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a)(1) (“The procedure on execution—and in proceedings supplementary to 
and in aid of judgment or execution—must accord with the procedure of the state where the court is 
located, but a federal statute governs to the extent it applies.”) 
 220.   Id. 
 221.  RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS, supra note 212, § 2, cmt. d. 
 222.  Id. § 3(b). 
 223.  Id. § 5. 
 224.  Id. § 7(a). 
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The ALI made reciprocity mandatory; the court “shall not” recognize 
or enforce the judgment without reciprocal treatment.225  Like the other 
bases mentioned above, the party resisting enforcement of the foreign 
judgment bears the burden to establish a lack of reciprocity and must raise 
at least “substantial doubt” about a reciprocal treatment.226  The party may 
do so via “expert testimony, or by judicial notice if the law of the state of 
origin or decisions of its courts are clear.”227  By placing the burden of 
proof on the party resisting enforcement and requiring that party to raise 
“substantial doubt” as to reciprocity, the proposed FJREA minimizes the 
risk that an American court will too easily refuse to recognize and enforce a 
foreign judgment.  This minimizes the risk of an ensuing vicious circle in 
which each court system refuses to recognize the other’s judgments 
because of a lack of reciprocal treatment in fact. 
Even without the Hague Judgments Convention, the FJREA is 
valuable to litigants desiring to enforce U.S. money judgments in foreign 
courts that have reciprocity requirements and yet are generally receptive to 
American judgments. Litigants will find it easier to demonstrate reciprocity 
because they can cite a uniform federal statute rather than the patchwork 
quilt of state laws, which leads to confusion.228  Indeed, as the reporters for 
the ALI project have noted, “it is virtually impossible to explain to French 
or Dutch or Japanese lawyers that a judgment originating in their country 
may be enforceable in New York but not in New Jersey, in Oklahoma but 
not in Arkansas.”229 
D. Greater parity in personal jurisdiction and judgment enforcement 
will improve the American delegation’s bargaining position and 
benefit U.S. consumers. 
Increased parity in the doctrine of personal jurisdiction will create an 
incentive for our Hague Convention negotiating partners to return to the 
negotiating table and hopefully make progress on the Hague Judgments 
Convention.  Our negotiating partners will have an incentive to continue 
 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  Id. § 7(b). 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  See Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, supra note 14, at 256. (“When proof of 
reciprocity is necessary in an overseas enforcement action, a litigant will want a judgment rendered in a 
United States jurisdiction that has a clear rule of its own on recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments.”). 
 229.  Silberman & Lowenfeld, supra note 136, at 636; see also RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT 
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS, supra note 212, at 1 (“[I]t would strike anyone as strange to learn that the 
judgment of an English or German or Japanese court might be recognized and enforced in Texas but not 
in Arkansas, in Pennsylvania but not in New Jersey.”). 
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negotiations on the Convention because it will establish a more uniform, 
predictable test for personal jurisdiction that is comparable to the Brussels 
Convention paradigm.  This simple, familiar test certainly seems preferable 
to a statute requiring consent to jurisdiction. And our European 
counterparts will still be able to use the Convention as an opportunity to 
foreclose exorbitant bases of personal jurisdiction, such as “tag” 
jurisdiction, against their constituents. 
Interestingly, although the Nicastro case further cemented the personal 
jurisdiction asymmetry, the Court’s recent general jurisdiction cases are 
new arrows in the American delegation’s quiver when we resume 
negotiations with our European partners.  The Court’s recent opinions in 
Goodyear and Daimler should remove some of our negotiating partners’ 
anxiety regarding excessive assertions of general jurisdiction.  In 
Goodyear, the Court stated that general personal jurisdiction requires a 
very substantial connection to the forum: “[a] court may assert general 
jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to 
hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State 
are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in 
the forum State.”230  In Daimler, the Court further clarified the “essentially 
at home” test, stating “the place of incorporation and principal place of 
business are paradig[m] . . . bases for general jurisdiction.”231 The 
“essentially at home” standard should help resolve European fears that 
American courts will exercise general jurisdiction over foreign 
corporations based on thin contacts. 
Perhaps even more important than parity in personal jurisdiction, the 
proposed FJREA creates an incentive to return to the Hague negotiations.  
In fact, the FJREA accomplishes two important tasks.  First, foreign 
countries will now have a greater incentive to enforce U.S. money 
judgments.  Because foreign judgments are generally more enforceable in 
the United States than U.S. judgments are abroad, foreign countries that 
already enjoy liberal judgment enforcement in the U.S. have a diluted 
incentive to recognize and enforce U.S. money judgments.  Why would any 
country subject its citizens to the loss of wealth and property that results 
from enforcing a U.S. money judgment when the foreign country’s citizens 
already enjoy the ability to enforce their judgments in the United States?  If 
a foreign country loses the advantage of this asymmetry, it will want to 
 
 230.  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (emphasis 
added). 
 231.  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (internal quotations omitted). 
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regain the ability for its citizens to enforce their judgments in the United 
States.  Accordingly, foreign countries will have a greater incentive to give 
up protectionist treatment disfavoring American money judgments by 
either unilaterally enforcing American judgments, or returning to the 
negotiating table in the hopes of consummating the Hague Judgments 
Convention. 
The proposed FJREA also preserves and enhances the enforceability 
of judgments in countries with which we already enjoy a liberal 
enforcement practice, despite reciprocity.  It is much simpler for a U.S. 
litigant to point to a single, uniform federal statute, and the comments and 
eventual case law interpreting it, in order to establish that the United States 
liberally enforces foreign judgments.  Both results are good for American 
business and consumers. 
V. CONCLUSION 
American law governing personal jurisdiction over foreign nationals 
and foreign judgment enforcement currently works to the disadvantage of 
Americans. This need not be so. The abandoned Hague Judgments 
Convention has the potential to level the playing field for American 
businesses and consumers alike.  And to encourage the parties to resume 
negotiations and bring about a compromise solution that will benefit all 
parties to the treaty, Congress can and should pass legislation that will 
simultaneously encourage the parties to return to the negotiating table 
while ameliorating the harsh effects of existing U.S. law.  Make no 
mistake, many obstacles remain to both successful negotiations abroad and 
domestic legislation like the FMLAA and FJREA.  But the payoff is worth 
it. 
 
